Prison Accountability and Performance Measures by Volokh, Alexander
Emory Law Journal 
Volume 63 
Issue 2 The 2013 Randolph W. Thrower Symposium — Privatization: Managing Liability and 
Reassessing Practices in Local and International Contexts 
2013 
Prison Accountability and Performance Measures 
Alexander Volokh 
Emory University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/elj 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Alexander Volokh, Prison Accountability and Performance Measures, 63 Emory L. J. 339 (2013). 
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/elj/vol63/iss2/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Emory Law Scholarly Commons. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Emory Law Journal by an authorized editor of Emory Law Scholarly Commons. For 
more information, please contact law-scholarly-commons@emory.edu. 
VOLOKH GALLEYSPROOFS 1/21/2014 4:05 PM 
 




A few decades of comparative studies of public vs. private prison 
performance have failed to give a strong edge to either sector in terms of 
quality. That supposed market incentives haven’t delivered spectacular results 
is unsurprising, since, by and large, market incentives haven’t been allowed to 
work: outcomes are rarely measured and are even more rarely made the basis 
of compensation, and prison providers are rarely given substantial flexibility 
to experiment with alternative models. 
This Article argues that performance measures should be implemented 
more widely in evaluating prisons. Implementing performance measures would 
advance our knowledge of which sector does a better job, facilitate a regime of 
competitive neutrality between the public and private sectors, promote greater 
clarity about the goals of prisons, and, perhaps most importantly, allow the use 
of performance-based contracts. 
Performance measures and performance-based contracts have their 
critiques, for example: (1) the theoretical impossibility of knowing the proper 
prices, (2) the ways they would change the composition of the industry, for 
instance, by reducing public-interestedness or discouraging risk-averse 
providers, and (3) the potentially undesirable strategic behavior that would 
result, such as manipulation in the choice of goals, distortion of effort away 
from hard-to-measure dimensions or away from hard-to-serve inmates, or 
outright falsification of the numbers. I argue that these concerns are serious 
but aren’t so serious as to preclude substantial further experimentation. 
 
 * Associate Professor, Emory Law School, avolokh@emory.edu. I am grateful to Michael J. Broyde, 
Russell C. Gabriel, Leonard Gilroy, Linda Hardyman, Erica J. Hashimoto, Peter H. Kyle, Christina Mulligan, 
Carl Nink, Usha Rodrigues, Joanna E. Saul, Sarah M. Shalf, Vladimir Volokh, and the participants at the 
Emory/UGA joint faculty colloquium for their input and assistance. I am also grateful to Kedar Bhatia and 
Julia Hueckel for their able research assistance, and to the law librarians at Emory Law School. Thanks also to 
the organizers and panelists of the Randolph W. Thrower Symposium, Privatization: Managing Liability and 
Reassessing Practices in Local and International Contexts, on February 7, 2013. A previous version of this 
Article was presented as the keynote address at the Vermont Law Review's symposium, Prison Privatization: 
Optimizing Our Use of a Privatized Resource, on March 23, 2013. 
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“Here arises a feature of the Circumlocution Office, not previously mentioned 
in the present record. When that admirable Department got into trouble, and was, 
by some infuriated member of Parliament . . . attacked on the merits . . . as an 
Institution wholly abominable and Bedlamite; then the noble or right honourable 
[member] who represented it in the House, would smite that member and cleave 
him asunder, with a statement of the quantity of business (for the prevention of 
business) done by the Circumlocution Office. Then would that noble or right 
honourable [member] hold in his hand a paper containing a few figures, to which, 
with the permission of the House, he would entreat its attention. . . . Then would 
the noble or right honourable [member] perceive, sir, from this little document, 
which he thought might carry conviction even to the perversest mind . . . , that 
within the short compass of the last financial half-year, this much-maligned 
Department . . . had written and received fifteen thousand letters . . . , had made 
twenty-four thousand minutes . . . , and thirty-two thousand five hundred and 
seventeen memoranda . . . . [T]he sheets of foolscap paper it had devoted to the 
public service would pave the footways on both sides of Oxford Street from end to 
end, and leave nearly a quarter of a mile to spare for the park . . . ; while of tape—
red tape—it had used enough to stretch, in graceful festoons, from Hyde Park 
Corner to the General Post Office. . . . No one . . . would [then] have the 
hardihood to hint that the more the Circumlocution Office did, the less was done, 
and that the greatest blessing it could confer on an unhappy public would be to do 
nothing.” 
    —Charles Dickens, Little Dorrit1 
“The results obtained from ENRD’s civil and criminal cases in fiscal year 
2012 alone were outstanding. We secured over $397 million in civil and stipulated 
penalties, cost recoveries, natural resource damages, and other civil monetary 
relief, including almost $133 million recovered for the Superfund. We obtained 
over $6.9 billion in corrective measures through court orders and settlements, 
which will go a long way toward protecting our air, water and other natural 
resources. We concluded 47 criminal cases against 83 defendants, obtaining 
nearly 21 years in confinement and over $38 million in criminal fines, restitution, 
community service funds and special assessments.” 
 —DOJ’s Environment & Natural Resources Division Annual Report, 20122 
 
 1 CHARLES DICKENS, LITTLE DORRIT 517–18 (Oxford Univ. Press 1989) (1857). 
 2 ENV’T & NATURAL RES. DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ENRD ACCOMPLISHMENTS REPORT FISCAL 
YEAR 2012, at 8 (2013). 
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INTRODUCTION 
“Isn’t everything to be said on [private prisons] already in print?” asks 
Sharon Dolovich.3 She means the question to be merely rhetorical; and so do 
I.4 The comparative effectiveness debate, to the extent it’s relevant5—and I 
think it is6—has stalled, simply because the empirical literature, exhaustive as 
it is, is so bad. “The current weight of the evidence on prison privatization in 
the United States is so light that it defies interpretation,” write prison 
researcher Gerald Gaes and his coauthors.7 (The theory isn’t much better: the 
same authors characterize prison performance as a “theoretically bereft 
domain.”)8 To intelligently choose between public and private provision, we 
should at least know which sector costs less, but we don’t; and we should at 
least know which sector provides higher quality, but we don’t have a great 
sense of that either.9 
This seems puzzling: readers of the voluminous debate on private prisons 
can be forgiven for thinking that market incentives should make private prison 
firms either (1) cut wasteful expenditures and produce innovative services10 or 
(2) cut corners on essential inmate care and security and lead to a humanitarian 
 
 3 Sharon Dolovich, How Privatization Thinks: The Case of Prisons, in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: 
OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 128, 129 (Jody Freeman & Martha Minow eds., 2009). 
 4 Not that her perspective is the same as mine, but we both agree that there’s still something left to say 
on the subject. 
 5 Dolovich herself is wary of premature engagement with the comparative effectiveness debate without 
having sorted through the necessary normative issues beforehand. See Dolovich, supra note 3, at 128–29; 
Sharon Dolovich, State Punishment and Private Prisons, 55 DUKE L.J. 437, 447 n.20 (2005). 
 6 See generally Alexander Volokh, Privatization and the Elusive Employee–Contractor Distinction, 46 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 133 (2012). 
 7 GERALD G. GAES ET AL., MEASURING PRISON PERFORMANCE: GOVERNMENT PRIVATIZATION AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY 184 (2004). 
 8 Id. at 123. 
 9 These aren’t the only things we should know. For instance, we can also care about where 
accountability is greater, which sector might be more likely to push the substantive criminal law in a more pro-
incarceration direction, and the like. See, e.g., Alexander Volokh, Privatization and the Law and Economics of 
Political Advocacy, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1197, 1199–1205 (2008); Developments in the Law—The Law of 
Prisons, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1838, 1868–91 (2002). 
 10 See, e.g., GEOFFREY F. SEGAL & ADRIAN T. MOORE, WEIGHING THE WATCHMEN: EVALUATING THE 
COSTS AND BENEFITS OF OUTSOURCING CORRECTIONAL SERVICES, PART II: REVIEWING THE LITERATURE ON 
COST AND QUALITY COMPARISONS 15 (Reason Pub. Policy Inst., Policy Study No. 290, 2002); Samuel Jan 
Brakel & Kimberly Ingersoll Gaylord, Prison Privatization and Public Policy, in CHANGING THE GUARD: 
PRIVATE PRISONS AND THE CONTROL OF CRIME 125, 134–43 (Alexander Tabarrok ed., 2003). 
VOLOKH GALLEYSPROOFS 1/21/2014  4:05 PM 
2013] PRISON ACCOUNTABILITY AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES 343 
disaster.11 Let’s focus on the positive claims for private prisons: if the private 
sector is so clearly superior, shouldn’t the difference hit us between the eyes?12 
On second thought, this isn’t so puzzling after all. The advantages of 
market provision are often said to be that, what with the rigidities and low-
incentive structure of government agencies, private firms have greater 
incentive and greater flexibility to figure out how to achieve any desired level 
of quality. But this assumes that (1) particular levels of quality are desired or 
encouraged, and (2) private firms are given the flexibility to achieve these 
levels. It turns out that both of these assumptions are wrong. 
Let’s take the quality problem first. Why not tally up the quality at a public 
prison, do the same at a comparable private prison, and compare the two 
quality measures? The trouble here is that—despite the scores of studies that 
have been produced purporting to measure quality differences—good 
performance measures are rarely used. As I document in Part I, this means that 
comparative quality studies are hard to interpret if one wants to know which 
sector is better. (This hasn’t prevented both partisans and detractors of private 
prisons from producing loosely reasoned pieces that oversell the findings of 
their favorite studies.) 
It doesn’t have to be that way. Criminologists have produced no shortage of 
performance measures that are appropriate for evaluating prisons, using 
variables like in-prison violence, the quality of prison health care, the degree of 
crowding, and—which I think is immensely important—recidivism.13 The 
most important thing about a performance measure is that it measure 
performance, that is, outcomes. Inputs like money spent, guards hired, or 
programs offered are of quite limited value, since the whole point is to see 
whether the money spent is worthwhile, whether the guards hired are 
necessary, and whether the programs are effective. Outputs like the number of 
doctor visits or the number of graduates of rehabilitative programs—like the 
number of memos written by Dickens’s Circumlocution Office14 or the number 
 
 11 See, e.g., Dolovich, supra note 5, at 474–80. 
 12 See, e.g., Philippe C. Schmitter, The “Organizational Development” of International Organizations, 
25 INT’L ORG. 917, 932 (1971) (calling this the “interocular impact test”). 
 13 I first (briefly) advocated performance measures for prison accountability in my student note. See 
Developments in the Law—The Law of Prisons, supra note 9, at 1887–88; see also Francis T. Cullen et al., The 
Accountable Prison, 28 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 77, 83 (2012) (“The core goal of the accountable prison is to 
reduce inmates’ recidivism.” (italics omitted)). 
 14 See supra text accompanying note 1. 
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of years of prison resulting from DOJ prosecutions15—are also of limited 
value. Doctor visits might just be make-work; the rehabilitative programs may 
not actually be rehabilitative. (The Circumlocution Office, whose function is to 
prevent things from being done,16 has a zero or negative contribution to 
performance; and the prosecutions that maximize prison time aren’t necessarily 
the same as those that most improve the environment.) What we care about—
prisoner health, decent conditions, actual rehabilitation—are the outcomes that 
we should actually measure, to the extent possible.17 
Why should we use performance measures? There are several reasons, 
which I canvass in Part II. 
First, it’s good just to know whether the public or private sector has higher 
quality, for instance in evaluating whether one’s state should outsource or 
insource a particular project, or whether it should be one of the nineteen states 
that don’t use private prisons at all.18 Naturally, many factors determine 
performance other than the quality of the management and the facilities: for 
instance, a prison can have better performance numbers because it was sent a 
better crop of people. But certainly having performance measures is better than 
useless. 
Second, using performance measures would help to implement a regime of 
competitive neutrality, where the public and private sectors could bid against 
each other and individual projects could shuffle from one sector to another. 
Competitive neutrality might be better than an all-public or all-private regime, 
but to implement it properly, the auctions should be evenhanded, which means 
that proposed costs and proposed quality targets should be fairly comparable. 
Performance measures would allow a winning contractor to commit to deliver 
a particular level of performance, and would allow governments to levy the 
appropriate contractual fine if this level isn’t achieved (or grant the appropriate 
reward if the level is exceeded). 
 
 15 See supra text accompanying note 2. 
 16 DICKENS, supra note 1, at 104–23. 
 17 See BERYL A. RADIN, CHALLENGING THE PERFORMANCE MOVEMENT: ACCOUNTABILITY, 
COMPLEXITY, AND DEMOCRATIC VALUES 15–16 (2006) (defining “input,” “output,” “outcome,” and other 
terms). 
 18 See E. ANN CARSON & WILLIAM J. SABOL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
BULL. No. NCJ 239808, PRISONERS IN 2011, at 32 tbl.15 (2012) (listing Arkansas, Delaware, Illinois, Iowa, 
Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New York, North 
Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island, Utah, Washington, and West Virginia as states with no inmates in private 
prisons in 2011). 
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Third, it would help policymakers express what’s desirable in prisons. One 
would think that this had been done already; but prison contracts are written in 
input and output terms because this is largely how the industry works and 
thinks. Performance measures have been a byproduct of the debate over prison 
privatization: the different sides in the debate needed them to argue in favor of 
or against privatization; and the development of these measures has in turn 
spurred serious thinking about what prisons should accomplish, which has had 
accountability benefits for the public sector as well. 
Perhaps most importantly, the use of performance measures would allow 
the spread of performance-based contracting, where—instead of levying a fine 
for not delivering a particular level of performance—one varies the contract 
fee continuously with the level of performance delivered. Once accountability 
is tied to actual performance—as is actually being done in the U.K.—giving 
prison providers the flexibility to choose how to do their job becomes more 
attractive. 
Part III discusses critiques of using performance measures as part of a 
compensation scheme. 
One concern is that the true social benefits of various aspects of 
performance are unknowable, either in principle or in practice, so that 
determining the proper prices will inevitably fail. Where a service is closely 
bound up with justice concerns, a focus on efficiency pricing may be 
inappropriate: it might demean the service or give insufficient weight to non-
efficiency goals. 
A second problem is that the use of performance measures will alter the 
composition of providers in the industry, in ways that are perhaps undesirable. 
One way this might happen is that, in the presence of monetary incentives, 
public-interested people may be less attracted to corrections. A different way 
performance measures can alter the composition of the industry is by 
increasing risk for providers. Providers can only control inputs, and the 
connection between inputs and outcomes is highly variable, because it depends 
on a great many variables, many of which are beyond the prison’s control—
such as general social conditions or the underlying quality of the inmates. The 
relationship between any of these variables and outcomes is not very well 
known. One might care about the fairness of rewarding or penalizing providers 
based on factors beyond their control, though in an auction system, such 
windfalls will be canceled out by competitive bidding. More seriously, the 
riskiness might bias the set of available providers in favor of the largest and 
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best-capitalized firms, and perhaps discourage experimentation with risky but 
promising techniques. This means that the sensitivity of price to outcomes 
might have to be limited, which might also limit the incentive effects. 
A third problem is that providers may engage in undesirable strategic 
behavior. They might manipulate the performance goals so they are easy to 
meet. They might focus their effort on the measurable dimensions of 
performance and slight the unmeasurable ones. (For example, what are the true 
outcomes of the justice system? Some outcomes, like case backlogs, are 
measurable, but other important outcomes, like accuracy of adjudication, 
aren’t—and measuring one runs the risk of distorting the agency’s effort away 
from the unmeasured outcomes.)19 Similarly, providers will want to choose the 
easiest-to-treat populations (“creaming” or “cherry-picking”), and (given a 
population) fail to treat the hardest-to-treat members (“parking”). And, of 
course, any system based on particular numbers comes with the risk that 
someone might try to falsify the numbers. 
The good news is that, for prisons, there’s hope that these concerns can be 
fairly addressed. At the very least, these concerns don’t seem so serious as to 
preclude far more experimentation than has been happening so far. We actually 
have access to reasonably good performance measures that reasonably cover 
the important dimensions of prison quality, none of which have to be limited to 
efficiency-based measures. These measures should be set by corrections 
departments, not by contractors. Riskiness can be addressed, at least in part, by 
only making part of the payment depend on performance. Social impact bonds 
have some promise in encouraging nonprofit-sector financing; in any event, the 
prison market is already highly concentrated, so there is currently no vast 
population of nonprofits and small companies to lose. Cherry-picking can be 
addressed by giving contractors no say in what inmates they’re given, and 
parking can be addressed, at least in part, by making monetary rewards depend 
on observable characteristics of the inmate (if, indeed, it’s a problem at all). 
Outright falsification of performance measures is a serious problem, which 
requires seriously investing in monitoring and ensuring robust disclosure 
regimes. 
 
 19 One might think that the reversal rate is a measure of accuracy of adjudication. But this isn’t true 
because (1) the cases selected for appeal aren’t random (in the absence of some special process to verify 
accuracy), and (2) given deferential standards of review, judges can work to insulate their decisions from 
appellate review if they’re so inclined—for instance, by making them more intensely fact-based. 
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None of these are perfect fixes, but we don’t need perfection; we just need 
an improvement over the status quo. 
I. THE FAILURE OF COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS STUDIES 
Somewhat surprisingly, for all the ink spilled on private prisons over the 
last thirty years, we have precious little good information on what are surely 
some of the most important questions: when it comes to cost or quality, are 
private prisons better or worse than public prisons? 
It’s safe to say that, so far at least, the political process hasn’t encouraged 
rigorous comparative evaluations of public and private prisons. Some states 
allow privatization without requiring cost and quality evaluations at all.20 The 
nineteen states that don’t privatize21 might, for all I know, be right to do so, but 
of course their stance doesn’t promote comparative evaluation. 
When studies are done, they’re usually so inadequate from a 
methodological perspective that we can’t reach any firm comparative 
conclusions. Section A below discusses the problems with cost comparison 
studies, and section B discusses the problems with quality comparison studies. 
Section C takes a broader view and notes that even well-done comparative 
effectiveness studies don’t answer all our questions. 
A. Which Sector Costs Less? 
1. Difficulties in Calculating Costs 
How do we determine whether the private sector costs more or less than the 
public sector? Ideally, we could work off of a large database of public and 
private prisons and run a regression in which we controlled for jurisdiction, 
demographic factors, size, and the like. In practice, this large database doesn’t 
exist, and so the typical study chooses a small set of public and private prisons 
that are supposedly comparable. 
 
 20 See Alexis M. Durham III, Evaluating Privatized Correctional Institutions: Obstacles to Effective 
Assessment, FED. PROBATION, June 1988, at 65, 67; Developments in the Law—The Law of Prisons, supra note 
9, at 1873–74. 
 21 See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
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Unfortunately, this comparability tends to be elusive; the public and private 
facilities compared often “differ in ways that confound comparison of costs.”22 
Sometimes no comparable facilities exist.23 Even where there are two prisons 
in the jurisdiction housing inmates of the same sex and security classification, 
they generally differ in size, age, level of crowding, inmate age mix, inmate 
health mix, and facility design.24 In particular, adjusting facilities to take into 
account different numbers of inmates is problematic, since facilities with more 
inmates, other things equal, benefit from economies of scale.25 
The GAO explained recently that “[i]t is not currently feasible to conduct a 
methodologically sound cost comparison of BOP [Bureau of Prisons] and 
private low and minimum security facilities because these facilities differ in 
several characteristics and BOP does not collect comparable data to determine 
the impact of these differences on cost.”26 The data problem mostly comes 
from the private side: information collected by the BOP from private facilities 
isn’t necessarily reported the same way that public data are reported, and the 
reliability of the data is uncertain.27 Moreover, “[w]hile private  
contractors . . . maintain some data for their records, these officials said that 
the data are not readily available or in a format that would enable a 
methodologically sound cost comparison at this time.”28 
Not only do federal regulations not require that these data be collected,29 
but also, and more troublingly, at the time of the GAO study in 2007, the BOP 
 
 22 DOUGLAS MCDONALD ET AL., PRIVATE PRISONS IN THE UNITED STATES: AN ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT 
PRACTICE 33 (1998). 
 23 See id. at 45 (making this claim about the Arizona facilities compared in CHARLES W. THOMAS, ARIZ. 
DEP’T. OF CORR., COMPARING THE COST AND PERFORMANCE OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE PRISONS IN ARIZONA 
(1997)); see also SCOTT D. CAMP & GERALD G. GAES, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, PRIVATE PRISONS IN THE 
UNITED STATES, 1999: AN ASSESSMENT OF GROWTH, PERFORMANCE, CUSTODY STANDARDS, AND TRAINING 
REQUIREMENTS 15 (2000). 
 24 See MCDONALD ET AL., supra note 22, at 34–35; see also Robert B. Levinson, Okeechobee: An 
Evaluation of Privatization in Corrections, PRISON J., Oct. 1985, at 75, 77. 
 25 Gerry Gaes, Cost, Performance Studies Look at Prison Privatization, NAT’L INST. JUST. J., Mar. 2008, 
at 32, 34; Douglas C. McDonald, The Costs of Operating Public and Private Correctional Facilities, in 
PRIVATE PRISONS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 86, 101 (Douglas C. McDonald ed., 1990). 
 26 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-6, COST OF PRISONS: BUREAU OF PRISONS NEEDS 
BETTER DATA TO ASSESS ALTERNATIVES FOR ACQUIRING LOW AND MINIMUM SECURITY FACILITIES 4 (2007). 
 27 Id. at 12–13. 
 28 Id. at 5. 
 29 Id. at 13. 
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didn’t believe there was value in developing the data collection methods that 
would make valid public-private cost comparison methods possible.30 
Probably more seriously, public and private prisons have accounting 
procedures that “make the very identification of comparable costs difficult.”31 
First, public systems, unlike private ones, don’t spread the costs of capital 
assets over the life of the assets, which overstates public costs when the assets 
are acquired and understates them in all other years.32 
Second, various public expenditures, including employee benefits and 
medical care, utilities, legal work, insurance, supplies and equipment, and 
various contracted services, are often borne by various other agencies in 
government, which might understate public costs by 30%–40%.33 One of the 
often-ignored costs in the public sector is the cost of borrowing capital.34 
Conversely, governments bear some of the costs of private firms, for instance, 
in various cases, contract monitoring, inspection and licensing, personnel 
training, inmate transportation, case management, and maintaining emergency 
response teams.35 
And third, when public or private prisons incur overhead expenditures, 
there’s no obvious way of allocating overhead to particular facilities—Gerald 
Gaes gives a specific numerical example involving Oklahoma, a high-
privatization state, where a difference in overhead accounting can alter the 
estimate of the cost of privatization by 7.4%.36 
 
 30 Id. at 7, 19, 30. The BOP’s view seems to have been chiefly based on the fact that it used private 
contractors to run facilities for criminal aliens and wasn’t expecting to receive funding to run its own. Id. The 
BOP also believed that the Taft cost study, see infra text accompanying notes 56–59, was already a sufficient 
cost study. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 26, at 7, 19, 21, 30. 
 31 MCDONALD ET AL., supra note 22, at 33; accord McDonald, supra note 25, at 88–89, 97–100. 
 32 MCDONALD ET AL., supra note 22, at 35. 
 33 Id. at 36. 
 34 See McDonald, supra note 25, at 106. 
 35 MCDONALD ET AL., supra note 22, at 36–37. 
 36 See Gerald G. Gaes, The Current Status of Prison Privatization Research on American Prisons 17–18 
(Feb. 2012) (unpublished manuscript), http://works.bepress.com/gerald_gaes/1 (“Other complications arise 
from the appropriate treatment of property, sales, or income taxes paid by private contractors, as well as profits 
from inmate phone calls and commissary accounts.”); see also MCDONALD ET AL., supra note 22, at 37. 
Private companies are also loath to divulge their own financial details. See McDonald, supra note 25, at 89; 
see also OFFICE OF PROGRAM POLICY ANALYSIS & GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY, FLA. LEGISLATURE, REPORT NO. 
95-48, PERFORMANCE AUDIT OF THE GADSDEN CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION 2 (1996); PUB. ACCOUNTS 
COMM., LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY, N.S.W. PARLIAMENT, REPORT NO. 13/53 (NO. 156),VALUE FOR MONEY 
FROM NSW CORRECTIONAL CENTRES 23 (2005). 
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As a bottom-line matter, McDonald says “the uncounted costs of public 
operation are probably larger than of private operation”;37 I tend to agree, but 
it’s hard to say for sure. 
2. Competing Cost Estimates 
The best way to see the importance of various assumptions is to look at a 
handful of cases where different people tried to estimate the same cost. 
Without committing myself to which way is correct, I’ll provide three 
examples: from Texas in 1987, from Florida in the late 1990s, and from the 
federal Taft facility in 1999–2002. 
a. Texas 
In Texas, private prisons were authorized in 1987 with the passage of 
Senate Bill 251,38 which required that private prisons show a 10% savings to 
the state compared to public prisons.39 Calculating the per-diem cost of public 
incarceration in Texas thus became important, since the maximum contract 
price for private providers would be 90% of that cost. 
The Texas Department of Corrections40 came up with an estimate of $27.62 
per prisoner per day.41 The Legislative Budget Board, however, proposed a 
number of additions to this cost, to better take into account the costs of 
complying with Ruiz v. Estelle,42 building costs, the state’s cost to provide 
additional programs that private firms would be required to provide, and the 
like.43 All these adjustments raised the estimated per-diem cost by about 
50%—to $41.67.44 In the end, contracts were awarded within a range of $28.72 
to $33.80—between the two estimates, though closer to the first one.45 
 
 37 McDonald, supra note 25, at 100. 
 38 C. Elaine Cummins, Private Prisons in Texas, 1987–2000, at 15 (2000) (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, American University) (on file with author). 
 39 Id. at 42; see also TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 495.003(c)(4) (West 2012). 
 40 Now absorbed into the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. See TEX. DEP’T OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 
AGENCY STRATEGIC PLAN: FISCAL YEARS 2013–17, at 2 (2012). 
 41 Cummins, supra note 38, at 155. 
 42 503 F. Supp. 1265 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (requiring the Texas Department of Corrections to alleviate 
overcrowding, increase the number of guards and support staff, and provide adequate health services), aff’d in 
part, rev’d in part, 679 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1982), amended in part, vacated in part, 688 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 
1982). 
 43 See Cummins, supra note 38, at 156–57. 
 44 Id. at 156 tbl.9. 
 45 Id. at 158; see also GAES ET AL., supra note 7, at 87–88. One facility received an extra $7.41 for an 
“intensive substance abuse treatment program.” Cummins, supra note 38, at 158. 
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b. Florida 
In Florida, the Office of Program Policy Analysis and Government 
Accountability (OPPAGA) compared two private facilities, Bay Correctional 
Facility and Moore Haven Correctional Facility, with a public facility, Lawtey 
Correctional Institution.46 After various adjustments, OPPAGA calculated that 
the per-diem operating cost was $46.08 at Bay and $44.18 at Moore Haven, 
versus $45.98 at Lawtey; that is, Bay was 0.2% more expensive and Moore 
Haven 3.9% cheaper than the public facility.47 
The Florida Department of Corrections had come up with its own numbers: 
$45.04 at Bay and $46.32 at Moore Haven, versus $45.37 at Lawtey48: Bay 
was 0.7% cheaper and Moore Haven 2.1% more expensive. 
The Corrections Corporation of America (CCA), which operated Bay, 
submitted comments to the OPPAGA report, disputing its analysis.49 It 
disagreed that Lawtey was comparable,50 and suggested its own adjustments to 
OPPAGA’s numbers for all three facilities. Under CCA’s analysis, Bay cost 
$45.16 and Moore Haven cost $46.32, versus $49.30 for Lawtey, which comes 
out to cost savings of 8.4% for Bay and 6.0% for Moore Haven.51 (OPPAGA, 
understandably, disputed CCA’s modifications.)52 
c. Taft 
Perhaps the best example of competing, side-by-side cost studies comes 
from the evaluation of the federal facility in Taft, California, operated by The 
GEO Group. 
A Bureau of Prisons cost study by Julianne Nelson compared the costs of 
Taft in fiscal years 1999 through 2002 to those of three federal public facilities: 
 
 46 OFFICE OF PROGRAM POLICY ANALYSIS & GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY, FLA. LEGISLATURE, REPORT NO. 
97-68, REVIEW OF BAY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY AND MOORE HAVEN CORRECTIONAL FACILITY 9 (1998) 
[hereinafter OPPAGA]. 
 47 Id. 
 48 FLA. DEP’T OF CORR., 1996–97 ANNUAL REPORT (1997), available at http://www.dc.state.fl.us/pub/ 
annual/9697/budget.html. These estimates were analyzed in FLA. DEP’T OF CORR., PRIVATIZATION IN THE 
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS (1998). See GAES ET AL., supra note 7, at 191 n.4. 
 49 OPPAGA, supra note 46, at 55–61 (providing CCA’s comments with OPPAGA’s comments 
interspersed throughout). 
 50 Id. at 57. 
 51 Id. at 61. 
 52 See id. at 59. 
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Elkton, Forrest City, and Yazoo City.53 The Taft costs ranged from $33.21 to 
$38.62; the costs of the three public facilities ranged from $34.84 to $40.71.54 
Taft was cheaper than all comparison facilities and in all years, by up to $2.42 
(about 6.6%)—except in fiscal year 2001, when the Taft facility was more 
expensive than the public Elkton facility by $0.25 (about 0.7%).55 Sloppily 
averaging over all years and all comparison institutions, the savings was about 
2.8%. 
A National Institute of Justice study by Douglas McDonald and Kenneth 
Carlson56 found much higher cost savings. They calculated Taft costs ranging 
from $33.25 to $38.37, and public facility costs ranging from $39.46 to 
$46.38.57 Private-sector savings ranged from 9.0% to 18.4%. Again averaging 
over all years and all comparison institutions, the savings was about 15.0%: the 
two cost studies differ in their estimates of private-sector savings by a factor of 
about five. 
Why such a difference? First, the Nelson study (but not the McDonald and 
Carlson study) adjusted expenditures to iron out Taft’s economies of scale 
from handling about 300 more inmates each year than the public facilities.58 
Second, the studies differed in what they included in overhead costs, with the 
Nelson study allocating a far higher overhead rate.59 
These examples should be enough to give a sense of the complications in 
cost comparisons; given these difficulties, it’s not surprising that most studies 
have fallen short. 
 
 53 JULIANNE NELSON, THE CNA CORP., COMPETITION IN CORRECTIONS: COMPARING PUBLIC AND 
PRIVATE SECTOR OPERATIONS 10, 39 fig.4, 42 fig.5 (2005).  
 54 Id. at 42 fig.5. 
 55 See id. The study also compared actual GEO costs to hypothetical costs if Taft had been kept in-house. 
This comparison gave the edge to the public sector, id. at 25–26, but I don’t stress this result because it’s based 
on a comparison with a hypothetical public institution, not on actual public-sector costs. 
 56 Douglas C. McDonald & Kenneth Carlson, Contracting for Imprisonment in the Federal Prison 
System: Cost and Performance of the Privately Operated Taft Correctional Institution (Oct. 1, 2005) 
(unpublished manuscript), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/211990.pdf. 
 57 Id. at 48 tbl.2.18. 
 58 Gaes, supra note 25, at 34. 
 59 Id. at 34–35; Gaes, supra note 36, at 20. 
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B. Which Sector Provides Higher Quality? 
1. Difficulties in Figuring Out Quality 
Moving on to quality comparisons, the picture is similarly grim. As with 
cost comparisons, sometimes no comparable facility exists in the same 
jurisdiction.60 Some studies solve that problem by looking at prisons in 
different jurisdictions, an approach that has its own problems.61 (If one had a 
large database with several prisons in each jurisdiction, one could control for 
the jurisdiction, but this approach is of course unavailable when comparing 
two prisons, each in its own jurisdiction.) Many studies just don’t control for 
clearly relevant variables in determining whether a facility is truly 
comparable.62 
Often, the comparability problem boils down to differences in inmate 
populations; one prison may have a more difficult population than the other, 
even if they have the same security level. Usually prisons have different 
populations because of the luck of the draw,63 but sometimes it’s by design, as 
 
 60 See MCDONALD ET AL., supra note 22, at 54–55 (discussing Arizona facilities compared in THOMAS, 
supra note 23); see also Gerald G. Gaes et al., The Performance of Privately Operated Prisons: A Review of 
Research, in MCDONALD ET AL., supra note 22, app. 2, at 12 (discussing Arizona facilities compared in 
THOMAS, supra note 23). 
 61 See MCDONALD ET AL., supra note 22, at 55 (discussing Charles H. Logan, Well Kept: Comparing 
Quality of Confinement in Private and Public Prisons, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 577 (1992)); see also 
CHARLES H. LOGAN, WELL KEPT: COMPARING QUALITY OF CONFINEMENT IN A PUBLIC AND A PRIVATE PRISON 
(1991). 
 62 See, e.g., Gaes et al., supra note 60, at 5 (criticizing the use of univariate methods in the comparison of 
Kentucky facilities in URBAN INST., COMPARISON OF PRIVATELY AND PUBLICLY OPERATED CORRECTIONAL 
FACILITIES IN KENTUCKY AND MASSACHUSETTS (1989)); id. at 18 (discussing the lack of information on 
characteristics of inmate populations in WILLIAM G. ARCHAMBEAULT & DONALD R. DEIS, JR., COST 
EFFECTIVENESS COMPARISONS OF PRIVATE VERSUS PUBLIC PRISONS IN LOUISIANA: A COMPREHENSIVE 
ANALYSIS OF ALLEN, AVOYELLES, AND WINN CORRECTIONAL CENTERS (1996)); id. at 19 (discussing the lack 
of controls for differences in number of inmates at some comparison prisons in ARCHAMBEAULT & DEIS, 
supra); see also, e.g., GAES ET AL., supra note 7, at 51–53 (discussing ARCHAMBEAULT & DEIS, supra); Scott 
D. Camp & Gerald G. Gaes, Private Adult Prisons: What Do We Really Know and Why Don’t We Know 
More?, in PRIVATIZATION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 283, 287 (David Shichor & 
Michael J. Gilbert eds., 2001) (critiquing ARCHAMBEAULT & DEIS, supra, and THOMAS, supra note 23). 
 63 See Gaes et al., supra note 60, at 4 (discussing the comparison of Kentucky facilities in URBAN INST., 
supra note 62, where the public sector had a more difficult adult population while the private sector had a 
more difficult juvenile population); id. at 9 (discussing TENN. SELECT OVERSIGHT COMM. ON CORR., 
COMPARATIVE EVALUATION OF PRIVATELY-MANAGED CORRECTIONS CORPORATION OF AMERICA PRISON 
(SOUTH CENTRAL CORRECTIONAL CENTER) AND STATE-MANAGED PROTOTYPICAL PRISONS (NORTHEAST 
CORRECTIONAL CENTER, NORTHWEST CORRECTIONAL CENTER) (1995)); id. at 11 (discussing ROBERT C. 
THOMAS ET AL., LEGISLATIVE BUDGET COMM., STATE OF WASH., DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 
PRIVATIZATION FEASIBILITY STUDY (1996)); id. at 20 (criticizing the use of the Angola facility as a 
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happened in Arizona, when the Department of Corrections chose “to refrain 
from assigning prisoners to [a particular private prison] if they [had] serious or 
chronic medical problems, serious psychiatric problems, or [were] deemed to 
be unlikely to benefit from the substance abuse program that is provided at the 
facility.”64 It’s actually quite common to not send certain inmates to private 
prisons; the most common restriction in contracts is on inmates with special 
medical needs.65 Not that all prisons must have totally random assignment; it 
can be rational to tailor prisoner assignment to, say, the programming available 
at a prison. But such practices do have “the unintended effect of undermining 
cost comparisons.”66 Another practice that undermines cost comparisons is 
contractual terms limiting the private contractor’s medical costs,67 though 
nowadays it’s increasingly common for contracts to transfer all medical costs 
to the contractor.68 
Some performance studies rely on surveys administered to a nonrandom 
sample of inmates69 or potentially biased staff surveys,70 or generally to 
populations of inmates or staff that aren’t randomly assigned to public and 
private prisons.71 Survey data aren’t useless, but they’re rarely used with the 
 
comparison facility in ARCHAMBEAULT & DEIS, supra note 62); id. at 20–21 (discussing that low urinalysis hit 
rates in ARCHAMBEAULT & DEIS, supra note 62, could indicate a population less inclined to use drugs, and low 
medical risk scores could indicate a population less in need of serious medical care). 
 64 THOMAS, supra note 23, at 73. 
 65 CAMP & GAES, supra note 23, at 21–22 (noting some restrictions in effect in 62.5% of the contracts 
surveyed; special medical needs restrictions in 50% of contracts; and other restrictions, including those for 
high-publicity inmates and gang members). 
 66 THOMAS, supra note 23, at 73. 
 67 See, e.g., Contract between the State of Tennessee and Corrections Corporation of America, RFS 
No.329.44-00408 § A.4.g.13)(a) (July 1, 2007), http://www.capitol.tn.gov/joint/committees/fiscal-review/ 
archives/106ga/contracts/RFS%20329.44-00408%20Correction%20%28CCA%20-%20amendment%201%29. 
pdf [hereinafter Tennessee CCA 2007 contract] (“If the inmate is hospitalized, the Contractor shall not be 
responsible for Inpatient-Hospital Costs which exceed $4,000.00 per Inmate per admission.”); id. 
§ A.4.g.13)(b) (“The Contractor shall not be responsible for the cost of providing anti-retroviral medications 
therapeutically indicated for the treatment of Inmates with AIDS or HIV infection.”). By its terms, this 
contract covers services at the South Central Correctional Center, id. § A.1.j, and runs from 2007 to 2010, id. 
§ B.1. 
 68 See, e.g., Notice of Request for Proposal, Ariz. Dep’t of Corr., 5000 Minimum/Medium Security 
Prison Beds, Solicitation No. 110054DC § 2.14.1 (Jan. 24, 2011) (on file with author) (“There is no medical 
cap per inmate, per year. The Contractor shall assume all health care related costs.”). 
 69 Gaes et al., supra note 60, at 6 (discussing DALE K. SECHREST & DAVID SHICHOR, PAROLE & CMTY. 
SERVS. DIV., CAL. DEP’T OF CORR., FINAL REPORT: EXPLORATORY STUDY OF CALIFORNIA’S COMMUNITY 
CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES (1994)). 
 70 Gaes et al., supra note 60, at 24 (discussing staff surveys in LOGAN, supra note 61; Logan, supra note 
61). 
 71 See GAES ET AL., supra note 7, at 74–76 (critiquing Judith Greene, Comparing Private and Public 
Prison Services and Programs in Minnesota: Findings from Prisoner Interviews, 11 CURRENT ISSUES CRIM. 
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appropriate sensitivity to its limitations.72 The higher-quality survey-based 
studies don’t give the edge to either sector.73 
Most damningly, many studies don’t rely on actual performance 
measures,74 relying instead on facility audits that are largely process-based.75 
Some supposed performance measures don’t necessarily indicate good 
performance,76 especially when the prisons are compared based on a “laundry 
list” of available data items (for instance, staff satisfaction) whose relevance to 
good performance hasn’t been theoretically established.77 
Gerald Gaes and his coauthors conclude that most studies are 
“fundamentally flawed,” and agree with the GAO’s conclusion that there is 
“little information that is widely applicable to various correctional settings.”78 
I would add that accountability mechanisms vary widely—the standard 
U.S. model, the Florida model, and the U.K. model are different,79 and these in 
turn differ from the French model80 or the model proposed for prison 
privatization in Israel before the Israeli Supreme Court invalidated the 
 
JUST. 202 (1999); Judith Greene, Lack of Correctional Services, in CAPITALIST PUNISHMENT: PRISON 
PRIVATIZATION & HUMAN RIGHTS (Andrew Coyle et al. eds., 2003); LOGAN, supra note 61; Logan, supra note 
61); see also Scott D. Camp et al., Quality of Prison Operations in the US Federal Sector: A Comparison with 
a Private Prison, 4 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 27, 32–34 (2002) [hereinafter Camp et al., Quality of Prison 
Operations]. For a general discussion of methods, see Scott D. Camp et al., Creating Performance Measures 
from Survey Data: A Practical Discussion, CORRECTIONS MGMT. Q., Winter 1999, at 71. 
 72 See RICHARD W. HARDING, PRIVATE PRISONS AND PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY 115–19 (1997). 
 73 See Camp et al., Quality of Prison Operations, supra note 71, at 49–50; Scott D. Camp et al., Using 
Inmate Survey Data in Assessing Prison Performance: A Case Study Comparing Private and Public Prisons, 
27 CRIM. JUST. REV. 26, 31 (2002); see also GAES ET AL., supra note 7, at 83. 
 74 Gaes et al., supra note 60, at 9 (discussing TENN. SELECT OVERSIGHT COMM. ON CORR., supra note 
63). 
 75 Not that prison audits are useless; Gerald Gaes, in fact, who is a big booster of performance 
measurement, discusses how audits could be improved to be made more useful. GAES ET AL., supra note 7, at 
31–37. 
 76 See Gaes et al., supra note 60, at 20 (discussing, in the context of ARCHAMBEAULT & DEIS, supra note 
62, how a low count of disciplinary actions could indicate either good or bad performance); id. at 25–27 
(discussing similar difficulties in interpreting items in LOGAN, supra note 61; Logan, supra note 61). 
 77 Camp & Gaes, supra note 62, at 286 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 78 Gaes et al., supra note 60, at 31 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING 
OFFICE, GAO/GGD-96-158, PRIVATE AND PUBLIC PRISONS: STUDIES COMPARING OPERATIONAL COSTS 
AND/OR QUALITY OF SERVICE 11 (1996)). 
 79 See, e.g., HARDING, supra note 72, at 158–65 (describing the “basic model” of accountability, the U.K. 
model, and the Florida model, and proposing a new model); David E. Pozen, Managing a Correctional 
Marketplace: Prison Privatization in the United States and the United Kingdom, 19 J.L. & POL. 253, 276–81 
(2003) (comparing American and British accountability systems). 
 80 See JON VAGG, PRISON SYSTEMS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF ACCOUNTABILITY IN ENGLAND, FRANCE, 
GERMANY, AND THE NETHERLANDS 305–07 (1994). 
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experiment.81 When a prison study finds some result about comparative 
quality, that tells us something about comparative quality within that 
accountability structure; if a private prison performed inadequately under one 
accountability structure, it might do better under a better one.82 
As an example of the problems with current quality metrics, consider the 
performance evaluations of the private federal Taft facility. As with the cost 
studies discussed above,83 we have two competing studies, the National 
Institute of Justice one by McDonald and Carlson84 and a Bureau of Prisons 
study by Scott Camp and Dawn Daggett85—the companion paper to Julianne 
Nelson’s cost paper.86 
The Bureau of Prisons has evaluated public prisons by the Key 
Indicators/Strategic Support System since 1989.87 Taft, alas, didn’t use that 
system, but instead used the system designed in the contract for awarding 
performance-related bonuses.88 Therefore, McDonald and Carlson could only 
compare Taft’s performance with that of the public comparison prisons on a 
limited number of dimensions,89 and many of these dimensions—like 
accreditation of the facility, staffing levels, or frequency of seeing a doctor90—
aren’t even outcomes. Taft had lower assault rates than the average of its 
comparison institutions, though they were within the range of observed assault 
rates.91 No inmates or staff were killed.92 There were two escapes, which was 
higher than at public prisons.93 Drug use was also higher at Taft, as was the 
 
 81 See HCJ 2605/05 Academic Ctr. of Law & Bus., Human Rights Div. v. Minister of Fin. ¶ 18 [2009] 
(Isr.), available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/05/050/026/n39/05026050.n39.pdf; Volokh, supra note 
6, at 180–85, 198–99 (discussing this opinion). 
 82 Gaes, supra note 36, at 30, also calls for more study of different accountability structures. 
 83 See supra text accompanying notes 53–57. 
 84 McDonald & Carlson, supra note 56. 
 85 SCOTT D. CAMP & DAWN M. DAGGETT, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, 
EVALUATION OF THE TAFT DEMONSTRATION PROJECT: PERFORMANCE OF A PRIVATE-SECTOR PRISON AND THE 
BOP (2005), http://149.101.37.70/news/research_projects/published_reports/pub_vs_priv/orelappin2005.pdf. 
 86 NELSON, supra note 53. 
 87 McDonald & Carlson, supra note 56, at 119; see also infra text accompanying notes 305–06. 
 88 Gaes, supra note 25, at 35; infra text accompanying note 172. 
 89 McDonald & Carlson, supra note 56, at 119. 
 90 Id. at 143. 
 91 Id. at 126, 127 fig.4.2. To focus on the three comparison prisons from the cost analyses, Elkton’s 
assault rate was similar to what would have been expected, while Taft, like Forrest City and Yazoo City, had 
lower rates than what would have been expected. Gaes, supra note 25, at 36. Yazoo City’s was the lowest. Id. 
 92 McDonald & Carlson, supra note 56, at 128. 
 93 Id. 
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frequency of submitting grievances.94 On this very limited analysis, Taft seems 
neither clearly better nor clearly worse than its public counterparts. 
The Camp and Daggett study, on the other hand, created performance 
measures from inmate misconduct data,95 and concluded not only that Taft 
“had higher counts than expected for most forms of misconduct, including all 
types of misconduct considered together,” but also that Taft “had the largest 
deviation of observed from expected values for most of the time period 
examined.”96 Camp and Daggett’s performance assessment was thus more 
pessimistic than McDonald and Carlson’s.97 
According to Gerald Gaes, the strongest studies include one from 
Tennessee, which shows essentially no difference, one from Washington, 
which shows somewhat positive results,98 and three more recent studies of 
federal prisons by himself and coauthors, which found public prisons to be 
equivalent to private prisons on some measures, higher on others, and lower on 
yet others.99 
2. Which Sector Leads to Less Recidivism? 
Recidivism reduction is really just one dimension of prison quality, though 
it’s a particularly relevant one that deserves its own section. 
If we found that inmates at private prisons were less likely to reoffend than 
comparable inmates at public prisons, this would be an important factor in any 
comparison of public and private prisons. Unfortunately, recidivism 
comparisons haven’t been very good either. 
A study from the late 1990s by Lonn Lanza-Kaduce and coauthors reported 
that inmates released from private prisons were less likely to reoffend than a 
matched sample of inmates released from public prisons, and they had less 
serious offenses if they did reoffend.100 But this study has been critiqued on 
 
 94 Id. at 143. 
 95 CAMP & DAGGETT, supra note 85, at 35. 
 96 Id. at 59–60. 
 97 But see infra text accompanying notes 469–78 (discussing how misconduct rates can be misleading 
since they depend on accurate and unbiased reporting by prison staff). 
 98 Gaes et al., supra note 60, at 31. 
 99 Gaes, supra note 36, at 25–26 (citing Camp et al., Quality of Prison Operations, supra note 71; Scott 
D. Camp et al., The Influence of Prisons on Inmate Misconduct: A Multilevel Investigation, 20 JUST. Q. 501 
(2003); Camp et al., supra note 73). 
 100 See Lonn Lanza-Kaduce et al., A Comparative Recidivism Analysis of Releasees from Private and 
Public Prisons, 45 CRIME & DELINQ. 28, 36–37 (1999) [hereinafter Lanza-Kaduce et al., A Comparative 
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various grounds.101 First, not all the recidivism measures are significant: while 
various reoffense-related rates were found to be significantly lower in the 
private sector,102 and while the seriousness of reoffending was found to be 
significantly lower in the private sector,103 a time-to-failure analysis found that 
there was no significant difference in the “length of time that a releasee 
‘survived’ without an arrest during the 12-month follow-up period.”104 Second, 
the public inmates seem to not really have been well matched to the private 
inmates; they only seemed so when their descriptive variables were described 
at a high level of generality (e.g., custody level vs. “the underlying continuous 
score measuring custody level,” whether inmates had two or more 
incarcerations vs. the actual number of incarcerations, etc.).105 Third, the 
authors seem to have made the questionable decision to assign an inmate to the 
sector he was released from, even if he had spent time in several sectors: thus, 
an inmate who spent years in public prison and was transferred to private 
prison shortly before his release was classified as a private prison releasee.106 
Fourth, a private releasee who reoffended could take longer to be entered in the 
system than a public releasee,107 so the truly comparable number of private 
recidivists may well have been larger than reported. 
A later study by David Farabee and Kevin Knight108 that “corrected for 
some of these deficiencies”109 found no comparative difference in the reoffense 
or reincarceration rates of males or juveniles over a three-year post-release 
 
Recidivism Analysis]; see also Lonn Lanza-Kaduce et al., The Devil in the Details: The Case Against the Case 
Study of Private Prisons, Criminological Research, and Conflict of Interest, 46 CRIME & DELINQ. 92, 96–97 
(2000). 
 101 The critiques are discussed in GAES ET AL., supra note 7, at 24–26. Gaes et al. argue, see id. at 27, that 
several of the critiques continue to apply to a later paper with a longer follow-up period, L. Lanza-Kaduce & 
S. Maggard, The Long-Term Recidivism of Public and Private Prisoners (2001) (unpublished manuscript) 
(paper presented at the National Conference of the Bureau of Justice Statistics and Justice Research and 
Statistics Association, New Orleans, 2001). 
 102 See Lanza-Kaduce et al., A Comparative Recidivism Analysis, supra note 100. The difference in 
rearrest rates is significant at the 1% level and the difference in resentencing rates is significant at the 5% 
level, but the differences in reincarceration rates and for any indication of recidivism are only significant at the 
10% level. Id. at 37.  
 103 Id. at 37–38. 
 104 Id. at 38–41. 
 105 GAES ET AL., supra note 7, at 25 (citing FLA. DEP’T OF CORR., BUR. OF RES. & DATA ANALYSIS, 
PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF A STUDY ENTITLED “A COMPARATIVE RECIDIVISM ANALYSIS OF RELEASEES 
FROM PRIVATE AND PUBLIC PRISONS IN FLORIDA” (1998)). 
 106 Id. at 26. 
 107 Id. 
 108 DAVID FARABEE & KEVIN KNIGHT, A COMPARISON OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE PRISONS IN FLORIDA: 
DURING- AND POST-PRISON PERFORMANCE INDICATORS (2002). 
 109 GAES ET AL., supra note 7, at 27. 
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period, though women had lower recidivism in the private sector.110 However, 
this study may still suffer from the problem of the attribution of inmates who 
spent some time in each sector, as well as possible selection bias to the extent 
that private prisons got a different type of inmate than public prisons did.111 
Another study by William Bales and coauthors,112 even more rigorous,113 
likewise found no statistically significant difference between public-inmate 
and private-inmate recividism.114 
A more recent study, by Andrew Spivak and Susan Sharp, reported that 
private prisons were (statistically) significantly worse in six out of eight 
models tested.115 But the authors noted that some skepticism was in order 
before concluding that public prisons necessarily did better on recidivism.116 
Populations aren’t randomly assigned to public and private prisons: that private 
prisons engage in “cream-skimming” is a persistent complaint.117 Recall the 
case in Arizona, where the Department of Corrections made “an effort to 
refrain from assigning prisoners to [the private Marana Community 
Correctional Facility] if they [had] serious or chronic medical problems, 
 
 110 FARABEE & KNIGHT, supra note 108, at ii–iii, 20–25. 
 111 GAES ET AL., supra note 7, at 28. 
 112 William D. Bales et al., Recidivism of Public and Private State Prison Inmates in Florida, 
4 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 57 (2005). 
 113 See Gaes, supra note 36, at 9. 
 114 Bales et al., supra note 112, at 69, 72, 74. 
 115 Andrew L. Spivak & Susan F. Sharp, Inmate Recidivism as a Measure of Private Prison Performance, 
54 CRIME & DELINQ. 482, 500 tbl.5, 501 (2008). 
 116 See id. at 503. 
 117 See, e.g., ARIZ. DEP’T OF CORR., REVISED FY 2009 OPERATING PER CAPITA COST REPORT 2, 4 (2010) 
(discussing inmates “returned to state prisons due to an increase of their medical scores that exceeds 
contractual exclusions”); id. at 10 (explaining that “[m]edical, dental and mental health treatment is provided 
but to a healthier inmate population based upon contractual criteria resulting in lower overall medical costs”); 
id. at 12–16 (discussing medical, mental health, and other restrictions on inmates that can be sent to particular 
private prisons); ARIZ. OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GEN., REPORT NO. 10-08, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS—
PRISON POPULATION GROWTH 20 (2010) (“[P]rivate prisons do not accept inmates in need of more serious 
medical care . . . .”); GAES ET AL., supra note 7, at 28; John J. DiIulio, Jr., The Duty to Govern: A Critical 
Perspective on the Private Management of Prisons and Jails, in PRIVATE PRISONS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST, 
supra note 25, at 155, 166–67 (stating that private firms “engage in correctional creaming when they bid,” 
meaning that they avoid bidding on facilities that they expect will “bring negative media attention, legislative 
inquiries, staff unrest, lawsuits, and judicial intervention”—that is, “the Atticas and Rikers Islands of the 
country”); Dolovich, supra note 5, at 505; Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Private Prisons Found to Offer Little in 
Savings, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2011, at A1 (discussing Arizona Department of Corrections study stating that 
private prisons “often house only relatively healthy inmates” and quoting State Representative Chad Campbell 
calling this practice “cherry-picking”). But see Gaes et al., supra note 60, at 34–35 (stressing that the federal 
Taft facility, the subject of the comparative study reported supra text accompanying notes 53–59, 83–94, will 
house inmates equivalent to those at the comparison facilities). 
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serious psychiatric problems, or [were] deemed to be unlikely to benefit from 
the substance abuse program that [was] provided at the facility.”118 But the 
phenomenon can also run the other way. One of the authors of the recidivism 
study, Andrew Spivak, writes that while he was “a case manager at a medium-
security public prison in Oklahoma in 1998, he noted an inclination for case 
management staff (himself included) to use transfer requests to private prisons 
as a method for removing more troublesome inmates from case loads.”119 
Moreover, recidivism data is itself often flawed.120 Recidivism has to be 
not only proved (which requires good databases) but also defined.121 
Recidivism isn’t self-defining—it could include arrest; reconviction; 
incarceration; or parole violation, suspension, or revocation; and it could give 
different weights to different offenses depending on their seriousness.122 
Which definition one uses makes a difference in one’s conclusions about 
correctional effectiveness,123 as well as affecting the scope of innovation.124 
The choice of how long to monitor obviously matters as well: “[m]ost severe 
offences occur in the second and third year after release.”125 Recidivism 
measures might also vary because of variations in, say, enforcement of parole 
conditions, independent of the true recidivism of the underlying population.126 
The study of the comparative recidivism of the public and private sector 
could thus use a lot of improvement.127 
 
 118 THOMAS, supra note 23, at 73; see supra text accompanying note 64. 
 119 Spivak & Sharp, supra note 115, at 503–04. 
 120 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 78, at 29–31 (discussing SECHREST & SHICHOR, supra 
note 69) (“Sufficient data were not available to adequately complete the analysis comparing the inmates 
released from the community correctional facilities to inmates released from other correctional institutions in 
the state.”); MICHAEL D. MALTZ, RECIDIVISM 58–60 (1984); Gaes et al., supra note 60, at 7. 
 121 See Brakel & Gaylord, supra note 10, at 154. 
 122 MALTZ, supra note 120, at 62; see ASS’N OF STATE CORR. ADM’RS, ASCA PERFORMANCE-BASED 
MEASURES SYSTEM COUNTING RULES 15–24 (2013), available at http://www.asca.net/system/assets/ 
attachments/5685/PBMS%20KeyIndicators%204_3_13.pdf. 
 123 MALTZ, supra note 120, at 63; see also JAMES DICKER, 2020 PUB. SERVS. TRUST AT THE RSA, CASE 
STUDY 2, PAYMENT-BY-OUTCOME IN OFFENDER MANAGEMENT 16 (2011) (“[N]either reconviction nor re-
imprisonment rates capture all re-offending behaviour, as only about 45% of offenders who are reconvicted are 
incarcerated and it is possible to be recalled to prison for breaching license conditions without being 
reconvicted.”). 
 124 See DICKER, supra note 123, at 18. 
 125 Id. at 16–17. 
 126 See MALTZ, supra note 120, at 66–67. 
 127 See Gaes, supra note 36, at 9–11 (discussing these studies). 
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C. The Limits of Comparative Effectiveness 
After having read the foregoing, one should be fairly dismayed at the state 
of comparative public-private prison research.128 In fact, it gets worse. An 
overarching problem is that most studies don’t simultaneously compare both 
cost and quality. It is hard to draw strong conclusions from such studies, even 
if they are state-of-the-art at what they are examining.129 
If we find that a private prison costs less, how do we know that it did not 
achieve that result by cutting quality? (This is the standard critique of private 
prisons.)130 If we find that a private prison costs more, how do we know that it 
did not cost more because of the fancy and expensive educational or 
rehabilitative programs it implemented?131 (According to Douglas McDonald, 
this was exactly the problem with the cost comparison of the Silverdale 
Detention Center in Hamilton County, Tennessee.)132 
Our goal should be to determine the production function for public and 
private prisons; this is the only way we will find out whether privatization 
moves us to a higher production possibilities frontier or merely shifts us to a 
 
 128 Some studies are actually meta-analyses. See Gaes, supra note 36, at 3–6 (discussing meta-analyses 
and literature reviews). Two recent meta-analyses showed little difference between the public and private 
sectors. One, only analyzing costs, found no statistical difference between the public and private sectors. See 
Travis C. Pratt & Jeff Maahs, Are Private Prisons More Cost-Effective Than Public Prisons? A Meta-Analysis 
of Evaluation Research Studies, 45 CRIME & DELINQ. 358, 365, 366 tbl.2 (1999). Another, looking at both cost 
and quality, found that the private sector was both slightly cheaper and slightly worse; but with such small 
effects, the authors concluded that “prison privatization provides neither a clear advantage nor disadvantage.” 
See Brad W. Lundahl et al., Prison Privatization: A Meta-Analysis of Cost and Quality of Confinement 
Indicators, 19 RES. ON SOC. WORK PRAC. 383, 392 (2009). A third—more a literature review than a meta-
analysis—reported that the comparison was “inconclusive,” Dina Perrone & Travis C. Pratt, Comparing the 
Quality of Confinement and Cost-Effectiveness of Public Versus Private Prisons: What We Know, Why We Do 
Not Know More, and Where to Go from Here, 83 PRISON J. 301, 301 (2003); and in any event there was no 
formal attempt to control for differences between the public and private prisons compared. See id. at 306. 
  Given that many of the underlying studies are flawed in various ways, it’s not clear how you do better 
by aggregating them. When studies done in vastly different ways and subject to different sources of bias are 
aggregated in a meta-analysis, the results are “garbage in, garbage out.” 
 129 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 78, at 13; see also Simon Hakim & Erwin A. 
Blackstone, Cost Analysis of Public and Contractor-Operated Prisons 4, 11 (Apr. 29, 2013) (unpublished 
working paper) (finding long-run cost savings between 12% and 59% but devoting scarcely any attention to 
quality). 
 130 See, e.g., Dolovich, supra note 5, at 474–80 (discussing the economic incentives inherent to private 
prison management for saving money by reducing overall quality of service). 
 131 See MCDONALD ET AL., supra note 22, at 34–35; Developments in the Law—The Law of Prisons, 
supra note 9, at 1875–78. 
 132 See McDonald, supra note 25, at 91. 
VOLOKH GALLEYSPROOFS 1/21/2014  4:05 PM 
362 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 63:339 
different cost-quality combination on the existing frontier.133 Realizing this 
allows us to throw out a lot of studies from the outset. 
At least people are taking more seriously the need to develop valid 
comparisons. Governments need to mandate, by regulation or by contract, that 
the information necessary to do valid comparisons become available, even if 
collecting these extra data would add to private facilities’ cost.134 Until we get 
a better handle on what works, public and private prisons should be required to 
live up to the same standards to facilitate comparisons. Private prisons should 
get the same types of inmates as public prisons—neither better nor worse135—
and they should be restricted in whom they can transfer out.136 
Having spent so long bemoaning the paucity of good comparative 
effectiveness studies, I should note that there’s more to life than comparative 
effectiveness. Even ignoring any differences between the public and private 
sectors, privatization can have systemic effects, altering how the public sector 
works.137 
For one thing, privatization can, for better or worse, change the public 
sector as well. Suppose private prisons are better than public prisons but 
competitive pressures lead public prisons to improve as well.138 A comparative 
study may not be able to find any difference between the two sectors, and yet 
one can still say that privatization was a success.139 (Indeed, one study does 
 
 133 Cf. Caroline M. Hoxby, School Choice and School Competition: Evidence from the United States, 
SWEDISH ECON. POL’Y REV., no. 2, 2003, at 9, 42 (“If school choice is to be public policy, and not merely an 
experiment, then the question we need to answer is whether students’ achievement would rise if they attended 
voucher or charter schools that had resources like those available to them in regular public schools. In other 
words, we should ask the achievement question, holding resources constant (as well as holding students’ 
ability, motivation, and other characteristics constant).”). 
 134 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 26, at 5, 13–14, 17, 19–20, 30. 
 135 See supra text accompanying notes 117–19. 
 136 See OFFICE OF PROGRAM POLICY ANALYSIS & GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY, STATE OF FLA., REPORT NO. 
95-12, REVIEW OF CORRECTIONAL PRIVATIZATION 4 (1995) (recommending restrictions on transfers out of 
private prisons). 
 137 Cf. Hoxby, supra note 133, at 19 (noting that “[school] choice can affect productivity through a variety 
of long-term, general equilibrium mechanisms that are not immediately available to an administrator,” like 
bidding up the wages of successful teachers and altering the mix of people who choose teaching as a career, 
making parents into more informed consumers by encouraging the spread of information about schools, 
altering what curricula are adopted, and the like).  
 138 See Charles W. Thomas, Correctional Privatization in America: An Assessment of Its Historical 
Origins, Present Status, and Future Prospects, in CHANGING THE GUARD, supra note 10, at 57, 59; see also 
infra Part II.A (discussing how privatization can improve accountability of the public sector). 
 139 Cf. Hoxby, supra note 133, at 43 (suggesting that concentrating on the effect on student achievement 
of private schooling vs. public schooling is wrongheaded in the school choice debate because school choice 
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suggest that for prisons, privatization might drive public agencies to be more 
efficient,140 though the statistical significance of this effect seems highly 
sensitive to the precise specification,141 and selection bias is a confounding 
issue.142) Similarly, if private prisons really do cost less, and therefore allow 
for greater increases in capacity, thus relieving overcrowding across the board, 
that effect will not show up in a comparative study.143 Likewise if best 
practices migrate from one sector to another through a process of cross-
fertilization144: Richard Harding calls this “the paradox of successful cross-
fertilization—that regimes progressively become more similar than dissimilar 
to each other.”145 
Alternatively, what if privatization leads to a race to the bottom? If private 
prison cost-cutting is harmful, and if public prisons have to cut costs to stay 
competitive, we may have lower quality, including higher recidivism, across 
the board.146 
 
can be a success if, through competition, it leads to improvements in the public sector, so that there never 
emerges any difference between public and private school outcomes). 
 140 See James F. Blumstein et al., Do Government Agencies Respond to Market Pressures? Evidence from 
Private Prisons, 15 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 446, 454 (2008); see also JAMES F. BLUMSTEIN & MARK A. 
COHEN, THE INTERRELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE PRISONS: DOES THE EXISTENCE OF 
PRISONERS UNDER PRIVATE MANAGEMENT AFFECT THE RATE OF GROWTH IN EXPENDITURES ON PRISONERS 
UNDER PUBLIC MANAGEMENT? 1 (2003) (concluding that “states that have some of their prisoners in privately 
owned or operated prisons experience lower growth in the cost of housing their public prisoners”). 
 141 See Blumstein et al., supra note 140, at 465 (finding an insignificant effect with two different 
specifications but a significant effect with a third). 
 142 The authors estimate the effect using a two-stage regression where the first stage represents the 
probability of privatizing, but this method doesn’t always take care of selection effects. See Alexander Volokh, 
Do Faith-Based Prisons Work?, 63 ALA. L. REV. 43, 67–73 (2011). Gaes also critiques the study. See Gaes, 
supra note 36, at 12–14. I have discussed or critiqued selection bias in many places. See Alexander Volokh, 
Choosing Interpretive Methods: A Positive Theory of Judges and Everyone Else, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 769, 803–
19 (2008); Volokh, supra note 9, at 1245–47; Alexander Volokh, Privatization, Free Riding, and Industry-
Expanding Lobbying, 30 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 62, 68 (2010) [hereinafter Volokh, Privatization, Free 
Riding]; Alexander Volokh, The Effect of Privatization on Public and Private Prison Lobbies, in 3 PRISON 
PRIVATIZATION: THE MANY FACETS OF A CONTROVERSIAL INDUSTRY 7, 24–26 (Byron Eugene Price & John 
Charles Morris eds., 2012) [hereinafter Volokh, The Effect of Privatization]. 
 143 Developments in the Law—The Law of Prisons, supra note 9, at 1875. 
 144 I discuss cross-fertilization at greater length below. See infra text accompanying note 194. 
 145 Richard Harding, Private Prisons, in 28 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 265, 334 
(2001). But see Tony Ward, Book Review, 3 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 125, 126 (1999) (reviewing 
HARDING, supra note 72) (conceding that Harding’s cross-fertilization argument is valid but noting that 
“[t]here seems to be a ‘heads I win, tails you lose’ quality to [Harding’s cross-fertilization] argument (if public 
prisons turn out to be better than private ones, that just proves that competition is good for them!)”). 
 146 See GAES ET AL., supra note 7, at 108; HARDING, supra note 72, at 138 (noting that reductions in 
public prisons’ staffing levels in response to competition could be alternatively characterized as “cross-
fertilization” or “industrial blackmail” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Gerald G. Gaes, Reaction Essay, 
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In either of these two cases, good empirical evaluations are necessary, 
though detecting such dynamic, systemwide effects will require before-and-
after studies, not comparative snapshots. 
Finally, to step back a bit from the privatization debate, regardless of what 
comparative effectiveness analysis shows, both sectors may fall short of the 
ideal, so this exercise should not blind us to the continuing need to reform the 
whole system.147 I will add that, even if the public and private sectors are 
equivalent, one can argue against privatization on the grounds that—assuming 
it costs less—it enables greater expansion of the prison system and therefore 
may increase incarceration and hinder the search for alternative penal 
policies.148 
II. WHY USE PERFORMANCE MEASURES? 
A. The Puzzle of Prisons? 
The moral so far is that the whole empirical literature on public and private 
prisons is inconclusive.149 As I noted in the Introduction, this should be 
somewhat of a puzzle for activists on both sides who claim that privatization 
should turn prisons into either humanitarian disaster zones or models of quality 
and efficiency.150 
Of course, that the empirical literature is inconclusive doesn’t mean the 
sectors are equivalent; it means that current methods haven’t been good 
enough to detect the difference. A methodologically deficient literature could 
hide evidence of either good or bad quality. But if the differences are great 
enough, you’d think they might show through even with bad methods.151 
The tentative conclusion I draw from the literature, though, is that there 
may be modest, but not huge, quality differences between the sectors; the 
public sector is better on some dimensions and worse on others, and there’s no 
good evidence that either sector does better at reducing recidivism. And while 
 
Prison Privatization in Florida: Promise, Premise, and Performance, 4 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 83, 87 
(2005). 
 147 See Dolovich, supra note 5, at 442. 
 148 See Volokh, supra note 6, at 142–43 & n.30 (collecting sources making this argument). 
 149 See also Alexander Volokh, The Modest Effect of Minneci v. Pollard on Inmate Litigants, 46 AKRON 
L. REV. 287, 324 (2013). 
 150 See supra text accompanying notes 10–11. 
 151 See supra note 12. 
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the private sector is probably cheaper, it remains to be seen whether the cost 
savings is on the order of 15% (respectable) or on the order of 3% (somewhat 
negligible).152 
But this puzzle largely disappears when we consider the institutional 
environment of private prisons. In many areas, the private sector has been good 
at delivering better results at a lower cost. This is because private producers are 
accountable to customers who care about the quality of the end product, and 
because they have the flexibility to change how they do things in response to 
problems they may encounter. Neither of these conditions is true for private 
prisons—not even slightly, not even as a first approximation. 
I have noted above that there is limited evidence of private firm 
innovation.153 But this is because private prisons are highly constrained in how 
they operate. Private prison contracts essentially “‘governmentalize’ the 
private sector,”154 reproducing public prison regulations in the private contract. 
Privatization can come to resemble an exercise in who can better pretend to be 
a public prison.155 
For instance, back in 1985, Robert Levinson complained of a contract with 
the Eckerd Foundation for the management of the Okeechobee School for 
Boys in which “[v]irtually every” contract item 
concerned input activities and pertained to administrative/operational 
functions. Thus, Eckerd could have been in total compliance with all 
contractual provisions even if every released client committed a new 
offense on the first day in the community. Moreover, at no point in 
 
 152 See supra text accompanying notes 53–57. 
 153 See, e.g., Camp & Gaes, supra note 62, at 287 (“In most of the literature in favor of  
privatization, . . . little or no detail is offered as to how . . . market pressures actually translate into real 
differences between public and private prisons . . . .”); Scott D. Camp, Editorial Introduction to Colloquy, 
Private Prisons & Recidivism, 4 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 55, 55 (2005) (stating that “little specific 
information is provided about why” private prison releasees should have lower recidivism); Dolovich, supra 
note 5, at 476 (noting that “[t]here is . . . little evidence of cost-saving innovation in private-sector prisons”). 
 154 Thomas, supra note 138, at 64; see also id. at 82, 100–02, 116 n.15. 
 155 See MCDONALD ET AL., supra note 22, at 49; Durham, supra note 20, at 67; Gaes et al., supra note 60, 
at 12 (“Generally speaking, the contract [discussed in THOMAS, supra note 23] stipulates that [the private 
provider] run the . . . facility in a manner similar to that in which the state would have operated the prison.”); 
id. at 17 (“Basically, the State of Arizona has taken the position that a private contractor should be given the 
opportunity to demonstrate it can [outperform] the state in running an Arizona prison according to Arizona 
Department of Corrections policy.”); Harding, supra note 145, at 303; Douglas McDonald & Carl Patten, Jr., 
Governments’ Management of Private Prisons 18 (Sept. 15, 2003) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/203968.pdf. 
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the contract were the criteria for noncompliance stated nor its 
consequences specified.156 
More recently, in Arizona, an auditor general report stated, 
The Department requires that private prisons mirror state-operated 
facilities, and performs extensive oversight activities to ensure that its 
contractors meet its requirements. In order to maintain uniform 
standards for state and private prisons, the Department requires 
contractors to follow Department Orders, Director’s Instructions, 
Technical Manuals, Institution Orders, and Post Orders. These 
requirements extend to specific details, such as following the same 
daily menus as state-operated facilities. Contractors may request 
waivers from the Department for policies that are not applicable to 
private prisons, such as state fiscal management practices, employee 
evaluations, and employee benefits.157 
The same daily menus! In Tennessee, “it even appears that private sector 
innovation was deliberately thwarted by making the private sector  
provider . . . abide by [state Department of Corrections] policy” in running the 
facility.158 
Subjecting private contractors to public regulations is actually quite 
common;159 one exception to this trend is Florida, where public and private 
prisons are controlled by different agencies,160 and the agency that regulates 
private prisons tries to balance “setting policy and encouraging innovation.”161 
More generally, input specification in private-prison contracts is routine, 
though of course the level of inputs specified can (and should) be “output-
driven” in the sense that it’s “related to output objectives.”162 For instance, one 
 
 156 Levinson, supra note 24, at 87; see also id. at 88 (noting that “close, coordinated monitoring of the 
contract by the state” may be precluded by “vague or nonexistent contract goals”). 
 157 DEBRA K. DAVENPORT, ARIZ. OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GEN., REPORT NO. 01-13, ARIZONA 
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS: PRIVATE PRISONS 9 (2001); see also Thomas, supra note 138, at 101. 
 158 Gaes et al., supra note 60, at 10.  
 159 CAMP & GAES, supra note 23, at vii (“[P]rivate contractors were typically obligated to use the training 
standards and policies of the public agencies.”); see also id. at 28. But see id. at ix (“[T]he private sector, even 
when there is no contractual obligation, has adopted the standards and policies of their public sector 
counterparts.”); see also id. at 32. 
 160 Id. at x, 32–33; see also HARDING, supra note 72, at 161. 
 161 CAMP & GAES, supra note 23, at x; see also Harding, supra note 145, at 303–04 (noting a similar 
situation in Western Australia). 
 162 HARDING, supra note 72, at 67–68 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Peter H. Kyle, Note, 
Contracting for Performance: Restructuring the Private Prison Market, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2087, 2111 
(2013) (“[S]ome states have started to require the provision of vocational services . . . .”). Harding does not 
distinguish between outputs and outcomes, see supra text accompanying note 17, so when he refers to outputs 
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can find liquidated damages provisions for certain input-based breaches like 
not complying with the state’s policies or not filling certain required 
positions.163 
If inputs and procedures are highly regulated, it’s not surprising that the 
evidence for private-sector improvements isn’t overwhelming. The market is a 
discovery process; one shouldn’t expect different methods to emerge unless 
innovation is permitted. 
And not only permitted: one shouldn’t expect different methods to emerge 
unless the incentives favor it. If the premise of privatization is that incentives 
work, particularly given the greater flexibility of private industry, 
micromanaging inputs and failing to incorporate the full range of desirable 
outcomes into the contract price means giving up on much of the possible 
benefit of privatization. 
But the efforts to measure performance in various areas of government 
from the Job Training Partnership Act of 1982164 and the Government 
Performance and Results Act of 1993165—and the limited efforts to make 
funding contingent on those performance measures166—have largely passed 
prisons by. 
Outcome measures aren’t totally absent. Contracts do include a limited 
range of outcome measures—for instance, limited penalties for escapes.167 But 
 
here, he means something like outcomes. Harding also suggests “intermediate outputs” as a synonym for 
“output-driven inputs,” HARDING, supra note72, at 67–68 (internal quotation marks omitted); perhaps this 
concept is close to what I refer to as simply “outputs.” See RADIN, supra note 17, at 15 (defining “output” and 
“intermediate outcome” differently). 
 163 See Leonard Gilroy, Innovators in Action 2012: Creating a Culture of Competition to Improve 
Corrections, REASON FOUND. (May 31, 2012), http://reason.org/news/show/1012923.html. 
 164 Pub. L. No. 97-300, § 106(b)(1), 96 Stat. 1322, 1333, repealed by Workforce Investment Act of 1998, 
Pub. L. No. 105-220, § 199(b)(2), 112 Stat. 936, 1059 (providing that permissible performance measures for 
job-training organizations include “(A) placement in unsubsidized employment, (B) retention in unsubsidized 
employment, (C) the increase in earnings, including hourly wages, and (D) reduction in the number of 
individuals and families receiving cash welfare payments and the amounts of such payments”). 
 165 Pub. L. No. 103-62, 107 Stat. 285 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 and 31 U.S.C.); see 
Laurence E. Lynn, Jr., Requiring Bureaucracies to Perform: What Have We Learned from the U.S. 
Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA)?, POLITIQUES ET MGMT. PUB., June 1999, at 1, 3; Matthew 
S. Schoen, Note, Good Enough for Government Work?: The Government Performance Results Act of 1993 
and Its Impact on Federal Agencies, 32 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 455, 467 (2008). 
 166 See infra Part III.C.1. 
 167 See, e.g., Tennessee CCA 2007 contract, supra note 67, § A.4.x.2 (“In the event of an escape resulting 
in whole or part from Contractor’s failure to perform pursuant to the provisions of this Contract, the State may 
seek damages in a court of competent jurisdiction.”). Note that there’s no provision for paying for escapes not 
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by and large, outcome-based compensation is rare.168 And to the extent there 
are outcome-based rewards or penalties, Charles Thomas argues, “the amounts 
involved commonly have little or no correlation with the true magnitude of 
what independent contractors accomplished or failed to accomplish,” and “the 
dollar value of the reward or sanction is often too trivial to encourage superior 
performance or to deter defective performance.”169 (Of course this isn’t always 
true: the state of Ohio recently fined CCA nearly $500,000 for contract 
violations found during audits, and many of these violations were 
performance-relevant.)170 Even developing outcome measures hasn’t been a 
high priority.171 
In 1998—not that long ago—Douglas McDonald and his coauthors 
identified two exceptional cases of performance-based compensation: the 
“Bureau of Prisons’ contract with Wackenhut for the operation of the Taft 
Correctional Institution in California,” which allowed for “an award-fee 
incentive worth up to 5 percent of paid invoices,” and a District of Columbia 
contract with CCA for the Correctional Treatment Facility, “which permit[ted] 
financial rewards for meeting targets based on performance indicators.”172 
Florida recently would have taken a good step in this direction, if the bill in 
question173 hadn’t been defeated. The bill would have required that private 
prison contracts make provision for measuring a number of dimensions of 
performance (though note that some of these are output measures): number of 
batteries, number of major disciplinary reports, percentage of negative random 
drug tests, number of escapes, percentage of inmates in “a facility that provides 
at least one of the inmate’s primary program needs,” and so on.174 The number 
of escapes also showed up in a more specific way: the contractor would have 
 
stemming from nonperformance—the contractor need only “exercise its best efforts to prevent escapes.” See 
id. § A.4.x.1. 
 168 See Kenneth L. Avio, The Economics of Prisons, 6 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 143, 150 (1998); Pozen, supra 
note 79, at 282–83; Thomas, supra note 138, at 107 (“[I]f there are contracts that include product-oriented 
requirements that go beyond mere evidence of participation, then they are contracts I have never read.”). 
 169 Thomas, supra note 138, at 109. 
 170 See Unique Private Prison Deal Leads to Backlash, CORRECTIONAL NEWS (Mar. 6, 2013), http://www. 
correctionalnews.com/articles/2013/03/6/unique-private-prison-deal-leads-backlash. 
 171 See Durham, supra note 20, at 67. 
 172 See MCDONALD ET AL., supra note 22, at 52. “Wackenhut Corrections Corp. changed its name to The 
GEO Group in November 2003 under the terms of a share purchase agreement with another company.” 
Volokh, supra note 9, at 1229 n.131. 
 173 S.B. 2038, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2012), available at http://flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2012/2038/ 
BillText/e1/PDF. 
 174 Id. sec. 1, § 944.7115(8)(f)(1)(a)–(r). 
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been required to reimburse the state for the costs of escapes.175 The Florida bill 
also listed required various performance measures for work release centers.176 
(I discuss various other performance measures below.)177 
The following sections develop these themes and discuss two distinct 
benefits of using performance measures. The first set of advantages of using 
performance measures, discussed in section B, is a pure accountability 
advantage: we, as citizens and policymakers, would know how well our 
prisons are doing; we’d be better informed in deciding which sector to choose, 
either systemwide or on discrete projects; and we could think more clearly 
about what prisons should be doing. The second type of advantage, discussed 
in section C, goes more to harnessing incentives to improve the system over 
time: incorporating performance measures into contracts, and tying providers’ 
compensation to how well they do, would give providers a reason to care about 
quality and simultaneously let us grant them greater flexibility. Section D 
discusses the normative issues involved in choosing the actual measures. 
B. Accountability, Neutrality, and Goal Setting 
1. To Know What Works 
We all want to improve prisons. But forget about that for a moment. Even 
before any of these improvements were possible, performance measures would 
have the obvious effect of allowing us to measure performance. This would be 
a great step forward in researchers’ ability to conduct quality studies. We 
would have a better sense of which sector provides better quality; combine that 
with better cost studies that take into account the pitfalls described above,178 
and we’d be better able to decide whether to be one of the nineteen states that 
(as of 2011) don’t have private prisons.179 If we do decide not to use private 
prisons, performance measures would help us determine which public prisons 
performed badly and where to look for improvement.180 
 
 175 Id. sec. 1, § 944.7115(11). 
 176 These were “(a) The percent of employment of supervised individuals; (b) The illegal substance use by 
supervised individuals; (c) The victim restitution paid by supervised individuals; (d) Compliance by supervised 
individuals with no-contact orders; (e) The number of serious incidents occurring at the facility; and (f) The 
number of absconders.” Id. sec. 1, § 944.7115(8)(f)(2)(a)–(f). 
 177 See infra Part II.D. 
 178 See supra Part I.A. 
 179 See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
 180 See Aloysius Bavon, Innovations in Performance Measurement Systems: A Comparative Perspective, 
18 INT’L J. PUB. ADMIN. 491, 493, 502 (1995) (discussing how performance measurement arose as a result of 
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2. To Implement Competitive Neutrality 
Suppose we decide not to use private prisons. Should we then contract out 
the entire prison system? Probably not: someone has to be able to run a facility 
if the current contractor has fallen down on the job or gone bankrupt,181 and 
given how concentrated the private prison industry currently is,182 it may not 
always be realistic to count on being able to easily bring in a competitor when 
this happens. 
How much of the system, then, should we privatize? The standard way to 
proceed is to choose particular prisons to privatize and put them up to bid to 
private firms, or to contract with private firms to use their own prisons. A more 
beneficial approach, though, would be to have a regime of “competitive 
neutrality,” where the public and private sector compete on the same 
projects.183 The best system may be one of mixed public and private 
management, where private programs “complement existing public programs 
rather than replace them.”184 (Health care reformers’ advocacy of the “public 
option” in health insurance was premised on a similar idea: that public 
participation can make competition more fair by disciplining private providers 
more than they would discipline each other.)185 
For instance, Gary Mohr, director of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation 
and Correction, has talked about creating a “culture of competition” in 
corrections.186 Ohio has pursued a combination of outsourcing and insourcing: 
some public prisons have been sold or their management has been contracted 
 
the perceived inefficiency of the public sector); Marc Holzer & Arie Halachmi, Measurement as a Means of 
Accountability, 19 INT’L J. PUB. ADMIN. 1921, 1922 (1996) (arguing that measurement improves 
accountability of the public sector). 
 181 See HARDING, supra note 72, at 158 (“The state must in the last resort be able to reclaim private 
prisons.”); Michael J. Gilbert, How Much Is Too Much Privatization in Criminal Justice?, in PRIVATIZATION 
IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 62, at 41, 76–77. 
 182 Volokh, supra note 9, at 1237–38. 
 183 See WILLIAM D. EGGERS, REASON PUB. POL’Y INST., HOW-TO GUIDE NO. 18, COMPETITIVE 
NEUTRALITY: ENSURING A LEVEL PLAYING FIELD IN MANAGED COMPETITIONS 6 (1998); Gaes, supra note 36, 
at 24. 
 184 Patrick Anderson et al., Private Corrections: Feast or Fiasco?, PRISON J., Oct. 1985, at 32, 38. 
 185 See JACOB S. HACKER, THE CASE FOR PUBLIC PLAN CHOICE IN NATIONAL HEALTH REFORM: KEY TO 
COST CONTROL AND QUALITY COVERAGE 1–2 (2008), http://ourfuture.org/report/case-public-plan-choice-
national-health-reform; see also WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE 
GOVERNMENT 217 (1971) (“In the 1930’s, the primary case for the creation of public power authorities was to 
provide a ‘yardstick’ with which to evaluate private electric utility monopolies.”). 
 186 Gilroy, supra note 163. 
VOLOKH GALLEYSPROOFS 1/21/2014  4:05 PM 
2013] PRISON ACCOUNTABILITY AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES 371 
out to the private sector, while one private prison has been taken in-house.187 
The result, according to Mohr, is that one can “ratchet[] up the best practices 
that can be created from both the public sector and multiple private 
vendors.”188 
But for this sort of system to work, we have to be able to fairly compare 
private-sector and public-sector bids before the fact. The cross-fertilization 
that’s supposed to result from competitive neutrality depends on flexibility, 
otherwise both sectors will try to do the same thing. But, without performance 
measures, flexibility undermines the ability to do the comparative analysis of 
bids that’s necessary to successfully implement cross-fertilization; the most 
straightforward way of making efficiency comparisons without performance 
measures is to mandate that the private sector replicate every public-sector 
procedure, down to the tiniest detail. And indeed, this is what Mohr did when 
contracting out the management of the North Central Correctional Complex 
facility to the private sector or when selling the Lake Erie Correctional 
Institution.189 
But with performance measures—and with an understanding of how 
proposed programs and methods translate into performance—he would have 
been able to take different proposals, translate them into expected 
performance, and thus have a basis for comparison, even if the proposals were 
radically dissimilar.190 (The beliefs about expected performance would then 
have to be verified by evaluating the winning contractor’s performance after 
the fact.) 
In particular, recall the problems involved in figuring out the public 
sector’s true costs191: the same problems can make for unfair competitions if 
public providers’ bids don’t include the costs they bear that are paid for by 
 
 187 Id. 
 188 Id. 
 189 See id. (“[I]n the [request for proposals], . . . . we replicated the post assignments and the staffing 
pattern and the policies and the food requirements. We basically said, ‘you must identify a minimum of a 5 
percent savings’ from exactly the cost of what it has cost us to operate North Central.”); see also id. (noting 
that “it was the same process” with Lake Erie Correctional Institution). 
 190 Ohio actually has performance metrics, which are a combination of output and outcome measures, 
covering “everything from violence indicators, to use of force indicators, to program completion indicators 
(GED, etc.), to recidivism data.” Id. But they apparently weren’t used in the way described above. 
 191 See supra Part I.A.1. 
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other departments, their different tax treatment, and the like.192 So it’s not 
surprising that such a regime is rare in the United States.193 
One of the advantages of competitive neutrality is that—as in Ohio—
prisons can be both outsourced and insourced at different times, depending on 
who wins the contract, so particular prisons can “churn” between the public 
and private sectors. The result, according to Richard Harding, would be a 
“process of positive cross-fertilization,”194 where best practices migrate from 
one sector to another.195 “[T]he opening up of the private sector,” Harding 
writes, “may heighten awareness of how sloppy public accountability has often 
been in the past, leading to the creation of innovative mechanisms applicable to 
both the private and the public sectors.”196 In fact, Harding argues, systemic 
improvement has been one of the best consequences of privatization,197 so 
narrowly focusing on which sector is better in a static sense is almost beside 
the point.198 
 
 192 See EGGERS, supra note 183, at 1, 8–11. 
 193 See Thomas, supra note 138, at 81, 86 (“I am aware of no example in the United States that reveals 
fair competition between public and private providers of correctional services. Until both of those policy 
failures are corrected, achieving many of the potential benefits of privatization will be impossible.”); cf. 
Harding, supra note 145, at 334 (explaining that such competition is also rare in Australia and the U.K.). 
 194 HARDING, supra note 72, at 115; accord id. at 162; Developments in the Law—The Law of Prisons, 
supra note 9, at 1890–91; Gilroy, supra note 163. 
 195 Joanna Saul, Executive Director of Ohio’s Correction Institution Inspection Committee, takes a 
different view, stating that churning 
would actually be horrific in practical application. The transition of prisons from public to private 
has been very difficult, with negative effects up to a year or more later. Private personnel have 
been very confused (or just ignorant) about the implementation of Ohio policies, which resulted 
in the really bad audit that they had at Lake Erie in Nov[ember]/Dec[ember] 2012. Further, the 
displacement of the public employees to other prisons caused a negative ripple effect across the 
system that will continue far into the future [because] people lost their seniority [and] the 
positions they had worked for, they came from different prison cultures, etc. 
Comments on a draft of this Article from Joanna Saul, Exec. Dir., Ohio Corr. Inst. Inspection Comm., to 
Alexander Volokh, Assoc. Professor, Emory Law School (Aug. 31, 2013). Perhaps Harding’s pro-churning 
and Saul’s anti-churning views can be reconciled: too much churning may be more trouble than it’s worth, 
since one will always incur transition costs when transferring a prison to new management. But the knowledge 
that churning might happen—that is, that a company could lose the contract to operate a prison—can exert 
beneficial competitive pressure. 
 196 HARDING, supra note 72, at 22–23. 
 197 See Harding, supra note 145, at 272–73, 331–36. 
 198 There remains the fear that, instead of systemwide improvement through cross-fertilization, we’ll get a 
race to the bottom, as Gaes worries. See supra text accompanying note 146. But good performance measures 
help avoid that problem. 
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3. To Express What We Want 
Measuring performance would do more than just let us know which sector 
is better and promote cross-fertilization by facilitating a competitive neutrality 
regime. On an even higher level, it would encourage governments to better 
conceptualize what makes for a good prison—an exercise that’s long 
overdue.199 
Jon Vagg, for instance, argues that, in the U.K., private prisons “were a key 
factor in persuading the administration that standards were necessary, if only 
for the purpose of monitoring contractual compliance.”200 And that example 
isn’t just a fluke. Prisons have been operating for centuries,201 and yet it was 
the experience of privatization that spurred the development of performance 
measures, as private-prison critics made arguments that privatization harmed 
quality and private-prison advocates made arguments to the contrary.202 Now 
that performance measures exist, one can use them to evaluate both the private 
and the public sectors, to the benefit of both. 
C. For Performance-Based Contracting 
With performance measures, we can go further than just knowing how 
good public and private prisons are, implementing competitive neutrality, and 
formulating the proper goals of the prison system—important as all that is. We 
can also incorporate the performance measures into contracts and make 
compensation contingent on performance, finally giving prison providers 
strong incentives to deliver high quality. 
1. Limited Current Efforts 
Performance-based compensation is being implemented in the United 
States to a very limited extent. As noted above,203 5% of the contract price at 
 
 199 See DICKER, supra note 123, at 6 (“[P]ayment-by-outcome . . . compels commissioners to state 
explicitly the goals of policy.”). 
 200 VAGG, supra note 80, at 307. 
 201 See, e.g., G. GELTNER, THE MEDIEVAL PRISON: A SOCIAL HISTORY (2008); RALPH B. PUGH, 
IMPRISONMENT IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND (1968); Edward M. Peters, Prison Before the Prison: The Ancient and 
Medieval Worlds, in THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE PRISON: THE PRACTICE OF PUNISHMENT IN WESTERN 
SOCIETY 3 (Norval Morris & David J. Rothman eds., 1995). 
 202 See GAES ET AL., supra note 7, at xi, 153, 180; HARDING, supra note 72, at 22; cf. NISKANEN, supra 
note 185, at 217 (“[T]he case for the private supply of some public services is . . . to provide a yardstick to 
evaluate the performance of budget-maximizing monopoly bureaus.”). 
 203 See supra text accompanying note 172. 
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the Bureau of Prisons’ Taft facility was performance-based. Taft was a 
demonstration project, which should give one a sense of how new this 
enterprise is.204 
The U.K. is now on the forefront of performance-based compensation, 
which it calls “[p]ayment-by-outcome” or “payment-by-results.”205 The idea 
was floated in a 2008 Conservative Party Green Paper206 and, once the 
Conservative Party came into power, it was developed in a 2010 Green Paper 
from the Ministry of Justice.207 Payment-by-results is being introduced in three 
prisons: two private prisons, Peterborough208 and Doncaster,209 and a public 
prison, Leeds,210 though the plan is to extend the model to all prisons by 
2015.211 The measure is the twelve-month reconviction rate,212 compared to a 
matched comparison group. At Peterborough, performance-based “[p]ayments 
start when the reconviction rate of the intervention group is 7.5% less than that 
of the matched comparison group, with increasing returns up to a maximum 
rate of 13%.”213 “The Peterborough pilot is the first in the world where private 
investors have assumed financial risk for reducing re-offending.”214 In addition 
to having access to a range of prison programs to prevent recidivism, offenders 
at Doncaster are assigned case managers to support them during their sentence 
and after release, offering advice and help on employment, housing, and 
benefits issues.215 (Earlier experience with payment-by-results was “primarily 
 
 204 Also, in Kansas, Senate Bill 14 rewards community corrections agencies for reductions in recidivism 
beyond a set target. See S.B. 14, 2007 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2007); CONSERVATIVE PARTY, POLICY GREEN 
PAPER NO. 4, PRISONS WITH A PURPOSE: OUR SENTENCING AND REHABILITATION REVOLUTION TO BREAK THE 
CYCLE OF CRIME 74 (2008); Cullen et al., supra note 13, at 90 (listing Washington’s performance-based 
evaluation of treatment programs; Arizona’s Senate Bill 1476, which provides for performance-based 
compensation of probation departments; and other programs in California, Colorado, Illinois, and South 
Carolina). 
 205 DICKER, supra note 123, at 6. 
 206 See CONSERVATIVE PARTY, supra note 204, at 49, 72–75. 
 207 See MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, BREAKING THE CYCLE: EFFECTIVE PUNISHMENT, REHABILITATION AND 
SENTENCING OF OFFENDERS, 2010, Cm. 7972, at 38–39 (U.K.). 
 208 See DICKER, supra note 123, at 13. 
 209 See Wesley Johnson, Payment-by-Results Project Bid to Cut Reoffending, INDEPENDENT (Oct. 11, 
2011), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/paymentbyresults-project-bid-to-cut-reoffending-2368793.html; 
John Biggin, Innovative Rehabilitation—Payment by Results at Doncaster Prison, GOV.UK (Oct. 13, 2011), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/innovative-rehabilitation-payment-by-results-at-doncaster-prison. 
 210 Joe Inwood, State-Run Leeds Prison to Be Paid on Results, BBC NEWS (Oct. 27, 2011), http://www. 
bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-leeds-15479570. Leeds Prison is also called Armley. Id. 
 211 Id. 
 212 See DICKER, supra note 123, at 13, 30 n.29. 
 213 Id. at 13. At Doncaster, payments start when the reduction is 5%. Biggin, supra note 209. 
 214 DICKER, supra note 123, at 13. 
 215 There’s also a twenty-four-hour help line. Johnson, supra note 209; Biggin, supra note 209. 
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limited to the welfare to work market[,] where success [was] varied and 
limited.”)216 
A parallel program focused on finding jobs for offenders, called Job Deal, 
compensates providers based on employment rates.217 Compensation is 70% 
fixed and 30% conditional—a third of the conditional payment is for an output 
measure, “successfully enrolling offenders” in the program; another third is for 
“a combination of outputs and processes” such as “helping clients open bank 
accounts”; and another third is “for achieving ‘hard outcomes.’”218 Note, 
though, that even these “hard outcomes” are softer than they might seem, 
because they include finding a job but also include “enrolling in further 
learning.”219 Some additional payment-by-results programs have also been 
proposed by the government or by the Social Market Foundation, focusing 
either on reoffending rates or on other outcomes or outputs like “drug use 
cessation or employment.”220 
2. The Range of Possible Contracts 
a. General Considerations 
These examples suggest how performance-based contracts could be 
structured. The contract could provide that the contract price is not just the 
usual flat per-diem per prisoner,221 but an incentive payment that—as a simple 
example—could vary (positively) with how many inmates find jobs or 
(negatively) with how many inmates are rearrested within two years.222 
 
 216 CHRIS NICHOLSON, REHABILITATION WORKS: ENSURING PAYMENT BY RESULTS CUTS REOFFENDING 5 
(2011); see also id. at 21–24 (discussing the experience with payment-by-results in the welfare to work 
context, characterizing the “Pathways to Work” program as unsuccessful and the “Employment Zones” 
program as reasonably successful). 
 217 DICKER, supra note 123, at 13. 
 218 Id. at 14. 
 219 Id. 
 220 Id. 
 221 Dolovich, supra note 5, at 474; see also Tennessee CCA 2007 contract, supra note 67, § C.3 (laying 
out schedule of per diems). 
 222 See Kenneth L. Avio, On Private Prisons: An Economic Analysis of the Model Contract and Model 
Statute for Private Incarceration, 17 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 265, 294–95 (1991); Daniel 
L. Low, Nonprofit Private Prisons: The Next Generation of Prison Management, 29 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & 
CIV. CONFINEMENT 1, 46 (2003); Kyle, supra note 162, at 2111–12; Gaes, supra note 36, at 23 (citing GAES ET 
AL., supra note 7). 
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Outcome measurements may not always be available for all dimensions of 
quality, so some measurement of inputs may continue to be necessary.223 But 
as far as possible, the ideal should be to make compensation contingent not on 
inputs like guard training, or even on outputs like the number of GEDs granted 
or the number of rehabilitative programs offered or ACA accreditation,224 but 
primarily on actual outcomes like the extent of unconstitutional conditions or 
how well prisoners are actually rehabilitated or how many prisoners get 
jobs.225 
The amount of the bonus can be a flat fee, or it could be more 
complicated—in the case of recidivism bonuses, the bonus could be inmate-
specific, depending on “the probability and social cost of recidivism for each 
inmate”—or it could even be determined by competitive bidding.226 It’s often 
charged that private prisons have little incentive to invest in rehabilitation,227 
and in fact have an incentive to try to increase recidivism, so that they can get 
(at least some of) the same inmates back later; if this is so, the bonuses should 
be at least high enough to counteract this incentive so rehabilitating inmates is 
affirmatively attractive to prison firms.228 
Though I focus here on monetary rewards and penalties, there are other 
possibilities. High performance could, instead of increasing a firm’s 
compensation in the individual contract, merely confer a reputational benefit, 
 
 223 Durham suggests that “process-oriented monitoring methods” continue to be used: “[A] system of 
frequent accounting of staffing levels can detect shortfalls in staffing that may lead to a diminution in service 
provision. . . . If the change in staffing levels is detected relatively quickly, efforts can be made to either 
restore institutional staff to initial levels or to alter the evaluation design.” Durham, supra note 20, at 66; see 
also DICKER, supra note 123, at 16 (suggesting intermediate outcomes such as drug misuse, stability of 
relationships, or becoming debt-free); Sidney A. Shapiro & Rena Steinzor, Capture, Accountability, and 
Regulatory Metrics, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1741, 1775, 1779 (2008); cf. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/T-
GGD-97-151, PERFORMANCE-BASED ORGANIZATIONS: LESSONS FROM THE BRITISH NEXT STEPS INITIATIVE 7 
(1997) (discussing why measuring inputs may be necessary in the context of British Next Steps agencies); 
Shapiro & Steinzor, supra, at 1779 (discussing why measuring inputs may be necessary in the context of the 
EPA and GPRA).  
 224 See MCDONALD ET AL., supra note 22, at 49 (“Correctional administrators . . . reported that 57 of the 
contracts in force at the end of 1997 required that facilities achieve ACA accreditation within a specified 
time.”). 
 225 See Kyle, supra note 162, at 2112–13. 
 226 Low, supra note 222, at 46; see also infra Part III.C.3. 
 227 The same charge can also be leveled against the public sector, where incentives generally aren’t 
strong. Currently, private prisons do invest in rehabilitative inputs as required by their contracts—something 
that isn’t always required in the public sector. 
 228 See Avio, supra note 168, at 150; Pozen, supra note 79, at 283–84; James Theodore Gentry, Note, The 
Panopticon Revisited: The Problem of Monitoring Private Prisons, 96 YALE L.J. 353, 362–63 (1986). 
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increasing its probability of winning future bids.229 One could give out 
certificates230 or “even simply publiciz[e] league tables of recidivism 
performance.”231 Or one could reward good performers by giving them more 
flexibility in future contracts.232 
b. Rewards or Penalties 
Going back to monetary incentives, one can choose between penalties for 
bad performance and rewards for good performance233—or one could have 
both—though the difference needn’t be that important. 
Consider a “rewards” contract that offers a $1 per diem reward for each 
unit of quality on a hypothetical 0-to-10 scale, so the potential reward is $0 to 
$10. Suppose Acme Corrections Corp. expects to achieve a quality level of 5 at 
a total cost of $35 per diem.234 Then it would be willing to submit a bid of $30 
or above for the project; it would just cover its costs with the $30 payment plus 
the $5 reward. (Recall that prison bids are bids on how much money the 
contractor will get from the government; a $30 per diem winning bid means 
that the contractor will be paid $30 per inmate-day.) Suppose bidding is 
competitive, other firms have similar technology, and Acme is the most 
efficient firm; then Acme wins the auction with its $30 bid.235 (A less efficient 
firm, say one that would require $36 per diem to achieve quality level 5, 
wouldn’t bid below $31, so Acme, as a more efficient firm, would be 
automatically rewarded up front for its higher quality by having a better chance 
of winning the auction.236 The bids don’t tell us the true social cost, the true 
cost to the government, or the true quality—that requires waiting for the actual 
realized level of quality, which determines the level of the reward—but they do 
signal which firm is (or believes that it is) more efficient.237) 
 
 229 See CONSERVATIVE PARTY, supra note 204, at 73–74 (describing Avon Park Youth Academy in 
Florida as “a prison rewarded by results,” even though its only reward was having its contract renewed, “a 
decision clearly influenced” by its lower recidivism results); DICKER, supra note 123, at 25. 
 230 Burt S. Barnow, The Effects of Performance Standards on State and Local Programs, in EVALUATING 
WELFARE AND TRAINING PROGRAMS 277, 286 (Charles F. Manski & Irwin Garfinkel eds., 1992). 
 231 Pozen, supra note 79, at 283; accord Cullen et al., supra note 13, at 86. 
 232 See Barnow, supra note 230, at 286. 
 233 See Thomas, supra note 138, at 108–09. 
 234 This is taking into account the incentive effects of the $1-per-unit reward. Perhaps earlier, with fixed-
price contracts, Acme only achieved, say, a quality level of 3 at a total cost of $32. 
 235 I discuss auction-theoretic considerations like the winner’s curse at infra text accompanying note 256. 
 236 See Gentry, supra note 228, at 363. 
 237 See also infra text accompanying notes 256–57. 
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Now consider an alternative “penalties” contract that offers a $1 penalty for 
each unit of quality below 10 (i.e., 7 units of quality lead to a $3 penalty). This 
contract has equivalent incentive effects to the previous one: a provider will 
invest in a unit of quality as long as its cost of doing so is under $1.238 
Therefore, these incentives, as before, make Acme expect to achieve the same 
quality level of 5, which we have seen carries a total cost of $35 per diem. 
Now Acme is willing to submit a bid of $40 or above for the project; it would 
just cover its cost with the $40 payment minus the $5 penalty. Again, with the 
competitive bidding assumptions listed above, Acme wins the auction with its 
$40 bid. 
So even though the contracts look different, they have essentially identical 
incentives, and any superficial differences between them are, roughly 
speaking, ironed out in the bidding process. The provider’s degree of risk 
aversion doesn’t change the result. The government can offer contracts with 
penalties, but then it will pay more to the winning bidder; or it can offer 
contracts with rewards, and the winning bidder will be satisfied with less. (One 
difference might be in the timing of the payments: if the base price is paid up 
front while rewards or penalties are processed some time later, the first 
contract is somewhat less valuable than the second because its payments are 
more delayed.)239 
c. Controlling for Baselines 
In the same way, it probably doesn’t make a huge difference whether the 
compensation takes into account the baseline level of quality. 
Controlling for baselines is a huge issue in the literature on performance 
measures.240 For instance, an early paper on performance measures, by Gloria 
 
 238 Here, I’m abstracting away from behavioral factors that might make rewards more attractive than 
punishments. See Cass R. Sunstein, Introduction to BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 1, 5 (Cass R. Sunstein 
ed., 2000); Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND 
ECONOMICS, supra at 30–31; see also Cullen et al., supra note 13, at 85 (“[U]nless a manager is truly 
oppositional and incompetent, we would not favor the use of negative sanctions—sticks—to coerce 
compliance with efforts to reduce recidivism. In the long run, such meanness would risk creating collective 
defiance and a failed reform.”). 
 239 See infra text accompanying note 392. 
 240 See, e.g., DICKER, supra note 123, at 20 & fig.2 (discussing use of “performance of control groups” or 
a whole range of control methods); GAES ET AL., supra note 7, at 159 (citing Carolyn J. Heinrich, Outcomes-
Based Performance Management in the Public Sector: Implications for Government Accountability and 
Effectiveness, 62 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 712 (2002) (questioning, as characterized by Gaes, “whether outcome 
measures in the absence of a control or comparison group can provide meaningful information” in the context 
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Grizzle and coauthors, discussed methodological issues regarding what makes 
for a good performance measure.241 A large part of the discussion focused on 
doing the proper econometric modeling to figure out the causal factors behind 
a performance measure.242 Figuring out these causal factors is important for at 
least two reasons (beyond merely understanding the process). One is to have a 
sense of what input or output measures to use if the outcome measures aren’t 
available in a given case.243 Another is to be able to properly assign credit, so 
providers who get a bad (or good) population of inmates aren’t blamed (or 
praised) for bad (or good) results.244 
Similarly, Gerald Gaes and his coauthors argue that “social scientists 
should push ultimate outcomes as far as they can be pushed,”245 but that, in 
light of the other factors that affect recidivism, “[i]t is also desirable to have 
more direct measures of intermediate changes to human behavior that precede 
desistance, and that may be influenced by criminal justice interventions.”246 
They don’t directly list desirable performance measures—they give an 
example of performance measures for the specific element of “Prison Security 
Performance,”247 though they stress that one should do a similar exercise for 
other elements of prison performance such as health care.248 The main 
characteristic of their approach is its emphasis on adequately modeling prison 
performance in terms of individual-level and institutional-level independent 
variables so that one can properly attribute credit where credit is due, avoid 
blaming prisons for factors beyond their control like the characteristics of the 
inmates, and figure out what inputs are actually important in producing prison 
performance.249 For instance, for health care, rather than measure (or in 
addition to measuring) the prevalence of a disease in the prison, which 
indicates the potential for transmission, it would be useful to use the number of 
 
of the Job Training Partnership Act)); Barnow, supra note 230, at 281 (“[P]erformance management systems 
[could] measure outcomes relative to [a] standard. . . . [that is] set to take into account what would have 
occurred in the absence of the program . . . .”); Kyle, supra note 162, at 2112 (controlling for “age, prior 
criminal history, and sex”); id. at 2113 & n.136 (controlling for crime rates). 
 241 GLORIA A. GRIZZLE ET AL., BASIC ISSUES IN CORRECTIONS PERFORMANCE 4 (1982). 
 242 See id. at 91. 
 243 See infra Part II.D. 
 244 See GRIZZLE ET AL., supra note 241, at 91. 
 245 GAES ET AL., supra note 7, at 7. 
 246 Id. 
 247 Id. at 142 tbl.10.1. 
 248 See id. at 141. 
 249 See id. at 144 (discussing differences with Logan model); see also id. at 4 (suggesting “develop[ing] an 
expected rate of crime for a community or an expected rate of misconduct for a prison based on characteristics 
of the people and inmates”). 
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cases in the incoming population as a baseline, and measure the number of new 
cases.250 
Is all this necessary? Let’s do our numerical example again: Consider the 
rewards contract discussed above, with a $1 per diem reward for every unit of 
quality on a 0-to-10 scale;251 the winning bidder, who expected to deliver 
quality level 5 at a cost of $35, would have won the contract with a bid of $30. 
Now consider a rewards contract that controls for the baseline level of quality; 
suppose the expected level of quality for this prison is 4, so a quality level of 5 
would yield a reward of $1. 
The only effect of the quality adjustment is to reduce reward payments by 
$4. A bidder who was willing to bid $30 on the unadjusted contract would be 
willing to bid $34 on the adjusted contract, to take into account the $4 
reduction in the expected reward. Either way, the payoff is the same to the 
contractor—and the price is the same to the government. The government 
saves $4 on reward payments but pays it all out again in the base contract price 
that emerges from the auction. Jeremy Bentham argued against controlling for 
baselines two centuries ago: 
I would make [the contractor] pay so much for every one that died, 
without troubling myself whether any care of his could have kept the 
man alive. To be sure he would make me pay for this in the contract; 
but as I should receive it from him afterwards, what it cost me in the 
long run would be no great matter. . . . 
. . . [Under this system,] you need not doubt of his fondness of 
these his adopted children; of whom whosoever may chance while 
under his wing to depart this vale of tears, will be sure to leave one 
sincere mourner at least . . . .252 
To be sure, the bidder has to have a way to figure out that the expected 
level of quality is 4. This requires two things. First, the bidder should have a 
belief about the proper model to predict the baseline quality level; different 
bidders can have competing beliefs about reality that lead them to different 
predictions. Second, it needs to have enough information about the population 
of inmates to plug into its model. Where either of these is absent, the 
contractor won’t know how much to bid—this might lead to excessive 
 
 250 See id. at 38. 
 251 See supra text accompanying notes 234–35 
 252 Gentry, supra note 228, at 362 n.52 (alterations in original) (quoting 1 JEREMY BENTHAM, 
PANOPTICON 71–73 (Dublin 1791)). 
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payments from the taxpayer’s point of view or insufficient payments from the 
contractor’s point of view—but the incentive effects will remain the same. 
So while adjusting for the baseline is relevant for various reasons—it 
allows one to more accurately assign praise or blame, rank different 
facilities,253 and so on—it doesn’t seem absolutely necessary for a 
compensation scheme to provide the proper incentives for improvement. 
Moreover, risk aversion makes a difference here,254 but not in the way one 
would expect. Controlling for baselines might even increase risk, depending 
on the uncertainty in the calculation of the baseline.255 
If the contractor gets too little, there is the concern that it might not be able 
to fund the project and might go bankrupt within the contractual term. But this 
is the same concern that happens with all bidding. Whether or not we adjust the 
payment for the baseline, the winning bid under a low-bid system will be 
subject to the “winner’s curse.”256 As a simple example, consider many firms 
with identical technology. They each have slightly different models for 
predicting how profitable a prison will be, and firms with higher predictions 
will submit lower bids. At most one of these models is correct; everyone else’s 
model is incorrect to some degree. The lowest bid will thus come from the 
bidder who makes the most wildly incorrect overestimate of his profits. 
Sophisticated bidders adjust their bids to take the winner’s curse into account, 
but the winning bidder might either be unsophisticated or end up not having 
adjusted his bid enough. So the threat of contractors who go bankrupt—or of 
 
 253 See GAES ET AL., supra note 7, at 144 (discussing concern with rank-ordering institutions). 
 254 Recall that it didn’t in the reasoning establishing the equivalence of reward and penalty contracts. See 
supra Part II.C.2.b. 
 255 Without controlling for baselines, the winning contractor gets a contract price of P and a performance-
based reward R, bears costs of C, and his payoff is P + R – C; the variance of the payoff is var(R) + var(C) if 
R and C are independent. Now let’s control for baselines; for simplicity, assume this just involves subtracting 
an adjustment A from the reward, where A is determined by the expected baseline level of performance. The 
contract price becomes P', and the contractor’s new payoff is P' + R – A – C. If A has no randomness—
everyone knows the government’s formula and everyone knows the underlying data that the government is 
plugging into the formula—then var(A) = 0 and the variance of the new payoff is the same var(R) + var(C). 
But if the data or the formula is somewhat uncertain, var(A) is positive, so the variance of the new payoff is 
var(R) + var(A) + var(C) if R, A, and C are independent, which is greater. 
  This doesn’t necessarily have to happen. Suppose, for instance, that R, A, and C aren’t independent, 
but instead there’s some negative covariance among R, A, and C. Then the randomness of A might cancel out 
some of the randomness of R and C, and the adjustment can indeed reduce risk. The point in the text, though, 
is that this needn’t be the case, and the adjustment, though often defended as a risk-reducing move for 
contractors, could end up doing the opposite. 
 256 See, e.g., PATRICK BOLTON & MATHIAS DEWATRIPONT, CONTRACT THEORY 283–85 (2005). 
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contractors who bid low and then try and hold the government up for more 
money257—is real. But, again, this happens regardless of whether we adjust for 
baselines. The solution is instead to require performance bonds, to rely on a 
track record of past performance (and restrict complete newcomers to small 
projects until they’ve proven themselves), or otherwise to try to weed out 
financially unsophisticated or untrustworthy parties. 
d. Discrete vs. Continuous Measures 
Note that, in the preceding example, the contract price varied continuously 
with the level of quality.258 Another possibility would have been to use a 
binary compensation scheme, where the reward or penalty is contingent on 
whether one reaches a particular target. This could look like “Get a fixed 
reward only if you achieve less than 50% recidivism.”259 
These binary schemes, while easier to implement, are problematic in 
several ways. Providers who don’t expect to be able to reach anywhere near 
the target have little incentive to try to achieve anything at all.260 Providers 
who do expect to be able to reach the target quite comfortably have little 
incentive to try to achieve anything additional.261 Providers who may or may 
not be able to reach the target are subjected to more risk than they would bear 
under a continuous scheme.262 Perhaps a large corporation might act somewhat 
 
 257 See Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 574 (2000); 
Robert W. Poole, Jr., Privatization, in CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS (2008), available at 
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/Privatization.html; Mary Sigler, Private Prisons, Public Functions, and the 
Meaning of Punishment, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 149, 155 (2010). See generally OLIVER HART, FIRMS, 
CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE (1995) (discussing opportunistic behavior in contract relationships). 
 258 Well, the example as worded involved discrete jumps, but one can easily imagine the prorated version. 
The “continuous” scheme is also called a “distance travelled” scheme. DICKER, supra note 123, at 16 (internal 
quotation marks omitted); see infra text accompanying notes 422–25, 436. 
 259 See HARDING, supra note 72, at 68 (“x per cent of participants [in a remedial literacy class] reaching 
attainment level y in z months.”). 
 260 See DICKER, supra note 123, at 19 (explaining that a continuous measure “may incentivise providers to 
engage with high-risk offenders who are unlikely to achieve absolute desistance”); HARDING, supra note 72, at 
68. 
 261 On the other hand, incentives are very large for those who could be just under the cutoff but could also 
reach the cutoff; but even then, unless the cutoff is a magical point, it’s probably more socially optimal to 
provide continuous incentives. 
 262 Kyle also notes the following advantage of a sliding scale: it “would reduce the likelihood that private 
companies would receive an undeserved windfall—the farther in standard deviations from the mean the private 
prison is, the more likely a causal relationship that should be rewarded exists.” Kyle, supra note 162, at 2112. 
More accurately, this depends on the likely effect of rehabilitative measures versus the likely magnitude of 
unobserved factors: it could be that a truly exceptional performance in fact reflects an unusually (and 
unobservedly) good or rehabilitable crop of inmates.  
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risk-neutrally, so risk won’t matter; but smaller firms or nonprofits may refrain 
from bidding, or may require more money to take the project, or may be 
reluctant to try high-expected-value but risky strategies.263 
(Of course, one could also imagine intermediate reward schemes: for 
example, the reward could be almost flat for any level of recidivism above 
50% and increase rapidly at or below 50%, for instance, “Get a reward of 
$0.01 for every percentage-point reduction of recidivism below 100% and 
down to 50%, and then a reward of $1.00 for every percentage-point reduction 
beyond 50%.”264 British performance contracts, where payments don’t start 
until the decrease in recidivism is 5% or 7.5%, and where payments are capped 
once the decrease is high enough, fit this mold.265 At this point I won’t do 
anything more than signal the existence of such contracts, though the optimal 
slope of the compensation scheme is something I’ll return to below when I 
discuss risk allocation.266) 
The same is true of penalties that may occur during the contractual term. 
Governments can terminate their contracts267—this is a form of binary 
scheme—though this is a rare remedy that tends to be reserved for the most 
extreme abuses.268 Providing for graduated financial penalties for abuses of 
different severity is probably a better solution than merely providing for 
contract rescission, because draconian penalties are less likely to be used. Not 
that termination isn’t appropriate in extreme cases—governments should 
always retain the ability to take over a prison if a contract is terminated.269 The 
need to retain a credible threat of termination is one reason to prefer that 
 
 263 See infra Part III.B.2. Some also mention the possibility that the public could see the continuous 
measure as being “too lenient.” See, e.g., DICKER, supra note 123, at 20. 
 264 See DICKER, supra note 123, at 24 (“[C]reate a minimum threshold of achievement that providers must 
attain before payments commence.”); id. at 25 (discussing a “target accelerator,” where increases are rewarded 
at an increasing rate). 
 265 See supra note 213 and accompanying text. 
 266 See infra Part III.B.2. 
 267 See Tennessee CCA 2007 contract, supra note 67, § D.3 (“The State may terminate this Contract 
without cause for any reason.”); id. § D.4 (“If the Contractor fails to properly perform its obligations under this 
Contract in a timely or proper manner, or if the Contractor violates any terms of this Contract, the State shall 
have the right to immediately terminate the Contract and withhold payments in excess of fair compensation for 
completed services.”). 
 268 See Dolovich, supra note 5, at 495–500; Developments in the Law—The Law of Prisons, supra note 9, 
at 1883–84. 
 269 See supra text accompanying note 181. 
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governments, not prison firms, own the prisons, since government ownership 
of the physical facility reduces termination costs.270 
3. The Feasibility of Merit Pay in the Public Sector 
Note, also, that while I’ve been primarily concentrating on incentives for 
private firms, there’s no inherent reason why performance-based compensation 
can’t also be considered for public prison wardens271—consider the example of 
Leeds noted above272—especially if we simultaneously pursue competitive 
neutrality.273 As John Donahue says, “the fundamental distinction is between 
competitive output-based relationships and noncompetitive input-based 
relationships rather than between profit-seekers and civil servants per se.”274 
Proposals to reward public servants for high performance aren’t rare,275 and 
merit-based compensation in the public sector has increased in recent years,276 
but it’s still hard to find in corrections.277 
Researchers differ on how feasible merit pay is in the public sector;278 I 
won’t resolve the argument here, except to note that the Government 
Performance and Results Act of 1993 has a procedure by which agencies can 
make “proposals to waive administrative procedural requirements and controls, 
including specification of personnel staffing levels, limitations on 
compensation or remuneration, and prohibitions or restrictions on funding 
transfers . . . in return for specific individual or organization accountability to 
 
 270 See Levinson, supra note 24, at 90 (discussing the “possibility of [a] contractor’s bankruptcy which 
would require rapid, costly interim arrangements”). 
 271 See Cullen et al., supra note 13, at 84; Rick Hills, Merit Pay for Prison Wardens?, PRAWFSBLAWG 
(Mar. 3, 2008), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2008/03/tying-the-salar.html. 
 272 See supra text accompanying notes 210. 
 273 See supra text accompanying notes 183–97. 
 274 JOHN D. DONAHUE, THE PRIVATIZATION DECISION: PUBLIC ENDS, PRIVATE MEANS 82 (1989) (italics 
omitted). 
 275 See NISKANEN, supra note 185, at 201–09; Barnow, supra note 230, at 307–08; Lynn, supra note 165, 
at 11; cf. David N. Figlio & Lawrence W. Kenny, Individual Teacher Incentives and Student Performance, 91 
J. PUB. ECON. 901, 903 (2007) (examining effects of teacher merit pay). 
 276 See Jon D. Michaels, Privatization’s Progeny, 101 GEO. L.J. 1023, 1048 & nn.124–25, 1049 (2013). 
 277 See Thomas, supra note 138, at 109. 
 278 Compare Harding, supra note 145, at 304 (“The financial incentive should drive performance in a way 
that is impossible in the state-funded public sector.”), and McDonald & Patten, supra note 155, at xxvii 
(“When structuring contracts, [governments] also have opportunities to create incentives and mechanisms for 
accountability that are more difficult to implement in existing public organizations.”), with GAES ET AL., supra 
note 7, at 151 (“There is certainly no reason why public administrators cannot award bonuses to the best 
performing public prison managers and their employees, while also demoting, firing, or transferring the 
managers who are substandard.”), and id. at 180 (“Contrary to the point of view of some scholars, we do not 
see how a contract offers an advantage over public provision.”). 
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achieve a performance goal.”279 Any such proposal, according to the statute, 
must “describe the anticipated effects on performance resulting from greater 
managerial or organizational flexibility, discretion, and authority,  
and . . . quantify the expected improvements in performance resulting from any 
waiver,”280 “precisely express the monetary change in compensation or 
remuneration amounts, such as bonuses or awards, that shall result from 
meeting, exceeding, or failing to meet performance goals,”281 and be “endorsed 
by the agency that established the requirement.”282 Just reading the statutory 
language—and this is a statute that purports to encourage flexibility—doesn’t 
exactly give one confidence that public-sector flexibility is easy to come by, at 
least in the federal system. 
At the very least, though, to the extent performance-based compensation is 
a good idea in the private sector, it may well also be a good idea in the public 
sector.283 How feasible that is is a question of the relevant state or federal law. 
D. What Measures to Choose 
The earlier discussion of how to define recidivism284 shows that a lot rides 
on choosing the outcome measures judiciously. This applies across the board, 
not just to recidivism. This section considers two distinct aspects of 
performance measures. The first is that wherever outcome measures have been 
used, output measures haven’t been abandoned. The second is that what 
outcomes to measure—and even whether something counts as an output or 
outcome measure—is inevitably a value-laden question, which must be 
resolved for a performance-based compensation scheme to go forward. The 
inevitable incompleteness of outcome measures—and therefore the need to 
supplement outcomes with outputs—can give rise to undesirable strategic 
behavior, which I discuss in a later section.285 
 
 279 Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 § 5(a), 31 U.S.C. § 9703(a) (2006).  
 280 Id. § 9703(b). 
 281 Id. § 9703(c). 
 282 Id. § 9703(d). 
 283 Some of the disadvantages of performance-based compensation may apply with different force in the 
public than in the private sector. For instance, the concern that market incentives will discourage public-
interested people from entering the industry, see infra Part III.B.1, seems to not apply at all to private 
providers, who are presumably already profit motivated. 
 284 See supra text accompanying notes 120–26. 
 285 See infra Part III.C.2. This section only covers what measures should rationally be chosen, not the real-
world possibilities for manipulation in the choice of goals. That sort of strategic behavior is covered infra Part 
III.C.1. 
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Adopting specific outcomes to measure is equivalent to adopting what John 
DiIulio calls an “operational” goal—“an image of a desired future state of 
affairs that can be compared unambiguously to an actual or existing state of 
affairs.”286 “‘Improving the quality of public education in America’ is a 
nonoperational goal; ‘Increasing the average verbal and math SAT scores of 
public school students by 20% between the year 1992 and the year 2000’ is an 
operational goal.”287 Similarly, “[r]eforming criminals” is nonoperational, 
while “[d]oubling the rate of inmate participation in prison industry programs” 
is operational.288 That last goal was output-based, but there’s no reason we 
can’t, as in the education example, adopt an outcome-based goal—we could 
just agree on a convenient if arbitrary measure of how well criminals are 
reformed, such as the two-year reconviction rate.289 Moreover, there’s no 
reason to adopt a numerical target as the goal (which would be binary); the 
goal might merely be (thinking more continuously) to reduce the rate as far as 
possible.290 And there’s no reason to adopt a unique goal: multiple operational 
goals can be implemented in one part of an overall index that determines 
compensation.291 
A useful way to explore this question is to examine some existing prison 
performance measures. Perhaps one of the oldest formal approaches292 to 
measuring prison performance is the Correctional Institutions Environment 
Scale293 developed by Rudolph Moos in the late 1960s294 and often used in the 
 
 286 John J. DiIulio, Jr., Measuring Performance When There Is No Bottom Line, in PERFORMANCE 
MEASURES FOR THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 142, 144 (1993). 
 287 Id.  
 288 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 289 See, e.g., Cullen et al., supra note 13, at 87 (“[T]he objectives should be stated in a concrete, 
unambiguous way: ‘The XYZ prison will reduce recidivism of released high-risk offenders so that no more 
than 20% are arrested within 1 year.’”). 
 290 See supra text accompanying notes 258–63. 
 291 Of course, one should also set the weights to be put on the various measures in the index. See infra 
Part III.A; cf. GRIZZLE ET AL., supra note 241, at 80; Barnow, supra note 230, at 284 (“Even if the program has 
a single objective, it may be advantageous to use several measures as proxies if an ideal measure cannot be 
developed.”). Realistically, the number of measures shouldn’t be too large, lest it overwhelm decision-makers’ 
cognitive capacities. One can’t think about all things simultaneously. 
 292 A survey article in 1975 reviewed 231 studies of particular performance measures, but at that time, in 
the authors’ opinions, there had apparently never been any comprehensive approach. (Presumably the Moos 
approach, if it was considered, was thought to be insufficiently comprehensive or not performance oriented.) 
The American Correctional Association had published comprehensive standards in the late 1970s, but they 
were primarily process oriented. See GRIZZLE ET AL., supra note 241, at 4 (citing DOUGLAS LIPTON ET AL., 
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CORRECTIONAL TREATMENT: A SURVEY OF TREATMENT EVALUATION STUDIES (1975); 
AM. CORR. ASS’N, MANUAL OF STANDARDS FOR ADULT CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS (1977)). 
 293 Michael Montgomery, Performance Measures and Private Prisons, in 3 PRISON PRIVATIZATION, supra 
note 142, at 187, 193. 
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1970s.295 The Moos scale contains several subscales: “Involvement,” 
“Support,” “Expressiveness,” “Autonomy,” “Practical Orientation,” “Personal 
Problem Orientation,” “Order and Organization,” “Clarity,” and “Staff 
Control.”296 These elements generally aren’t true performance measures, and 
it’s immediately apparent from their definitions that some are highly 
impressionistic. The “Involvement” variable “[m]easures how active and 
energetic residents are”; the “Support” variable “[m]easures the extent to 
which residents are encouraged to be helpful and supportive”; and so on, with 
an emphasis on measuring the extent of supportiveness and encouragement.297 
The scale was criticized because it wasn’t clear what the difference between 
some of the elements was and to what extent they were correlated,298 and even 
to what extent they described a real phenomenon.299 Some critics wrote that 
“when the CIES is administered and the individual scores are tallied and 
averaged, we really have no idea what the scores on the nine subscales 
indicate.”300 Ultimately, the scale was “determined not to possess acceptable 
validity.”301 
A later approach, described in 1980 in a report by Martha Burt, uses five 
types of measures: “Measures of Security,” including the escape rate and 
escape seriousness; “Measures of Living and Safety Conditions,” such as 
victimization, overcrowding, and sanitation; “Measures of Inmate Health” 
(both physical and mental); “Intermediate Products of Programs and Services” 
like improvements in basic skills and vocational education completed; and 
“Measures of Post-Release Success,” including employment success and 
recidivism.302 Only the fourth category is explicitly labeled “Intermediate 
Products,”303 but some of the other measures are also outputs, not outcomes—
 
 294 Kevin N. Wright & James Boudouris, An Assessment of the Moos Correctional Institutions 
Environment Scale, 19 J. RES. IN CRIME & DELINQ. 255, 255 (1982). 
 295 See id. (citing sources using the Moos scale in the 1970s). 
 296 Id. at 257 (quoting RUDOLF H. MOOS, EVALUATING CORRECTIONAL AND COMMUNITY SETTINGS 41 
(1975)). 
 297 Id. 
 298 Id. at 256; Elaine Selo, Book Review, 4 J. CRIM. JUST. 348, 349 (1976) (reviewing MOOS, supra note 
296). 
 299 Wright & Boudouris, supra note 294, at 258. 
 300 Id. at 274. 
 301 Montgomery, supra note 293, at 193. 
 302 MARTHA R. BURT, URBAN INST., MEASURING PRISON RESULTS: WAYS TO MONITOR AND EVALUATE 
CORRECTIONS PERFORMANCE, at ii (1980). 
 303 Id. at 97–105. 
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see, for instance, the use of hospitalizations and sick days in the measures of 
inmate health.304 
The mixing of output and outcome measures is fairly typical; John DiIulio 
criticizes the BOP’s Key Indicators/Strategic Support System305 for also 
“indiscriminate[ly] mixing . . . process [i.e., input or output] and performance 
[i.e., outcome] measures.”306 But DiIulio himself has measured prison quality 
in terms of “order (rates of individual and collective violence and other forms 
of misconduct), amenity (availability of clean cells, decent food, etc.), and 
service (availability of work opportunities, educational programs, etc.)”307: 
note the output measures in the inclusion of the availability (not the 
effectiveness) of programming. 
The MTC Institute, the research arm of the private prison firm Management 
& Training Corp. (MTC), likewise calls for holding prisons accountable for 
“outcomes”; but these “outcomes” include not only assaults, escapes, 
recidivism, overcrowding, and the like, but also outputs like “[s]ubstance abuse 
education/treatment completions” and “[p]roportion of inmates participating in 
spiritual development program(s).”308 
The American Correctional Association’s performance-based standards for 
correctional health care309 raise the same issue. Some of these are true 
outcomes, like “the rate of positive tuberculin skin tests”310 or the suicide 
rate,311 though others are process measures or expected practices, like whether 
an offender “is informed about access to health systems and the grievance 
procedure.”312 The Prison Social Climate Survey, which is based on inmate 
and staff surveys, likewise mixes outcomes (such as crowding313 or safety314) 
 
 304 Id. at 72. 
 305 See generally WILLIAM G. SAYLOR, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, DEVELOPING A STRATEGIC SUPPORT 
SYSTEM: MONITORING THE BUREAU’S PERFORMANCE VIA TRENDS IN KEY INDICATORS (1988). 
 306 DiIulio, supra note 286, at 150–52. 
 307 John J. DiIulio, Jr., Recovering the Public Management Variable: Lessons from Schools, Prisons, and 
Armies, 49 PUB. ADM. REV. 127, 129 (1989) (citing JOHN J. DIIULIO, JR., GOVERNING PRISONS: A 
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF CORRECTIONAL MANAGEMENT (1987)). 
 308 MTC INST., MEASURING SUCCESS: IMPROVING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES 5 
(2006). 
 309 AM. CORR. ASS’N, PERFORMANCE-BASED STANDARDS FOR CORRECTIONAL HEALTH CARE IN ADULT 
CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS (2002). These standards are discussed in GAES ET AL., supra note 7, at 37–38. 
 310 GAES ET AL., supra note 7, at 37. 
 311 Id. at 38. 
 312 Id. at 37. 
 313 Michael W. Ross et al., Measurement of Prison Social Climate: A Comparison of an Inmate Measure 
in England and the USA, 10 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 447, 460–61 tbl.3 (2008). 
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with outputs (such as whether the prison is a pleasant place to work for 
staff315). 
It is clear, then, that outcomes and output measures tend to go together; no 
doubt this is because not all outcomes are well measurable. Moreover, the 
choice of measures, and even the basic question of whether to classify a 
measure as an output or an outcome, is inevitably value-laden. We can see this 
clearly by examining Charles Logan’s “quality of confinement” index, one of 
the more highly regarded prison performance measures.316 Logan’s 
performance indicators focus on eight broad categories: 
1. “Security (‘keep them in’).” 
2. “Safety (‘keep them safe’).” 
3. “Order (‘keep them in line’).” 
4. “Care (‘keep them healthy’).” 
5. “Activity (‘keep them busy’).” 
6. “Justice (‘do it with fairness’).” 
7. “Conditions (‘without undue suffering’).” 
8. “Management (‘as efficiently as possible’).”317 
Each of these categories contains a number of subdimensions: for instance, 
the “security” category contains the subdimensions of security procedures, 
drug use, significant incidents, community exposure, freedom of movement, 
and staffing adequacy.318 The “safety” category contains safety of inmates, 
safety of staff, dangerousness of inmates, safety of environment, and (again) 
staffing adequacy.319 
 
 314 Id. at 463, 466–67 tbl.5. 
 315 See WILLIAM G. SAYLOR ET AL., FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, PRISON SOCIAL CLIMATE SURVEY: 
RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY ANALYSES OF THE WORK ENVIRONMENT CONSTRUCTS 3–8 (1996); see also supra 
text accompanying note 87. 
 316 Charles H. Logan, Criminal Justice Performance Measures for Prisons, in PERFORMANCE MEASURES 
FOR THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 286, at 19; see GAES ET AL., supra note 7, at xi (calling 
Logan’s approach “one serious attempt to develop a coherent theoretical and empirical approach to prison 
performance measurement”); id. at 5–8 (discussing Logan’s model). Joan Petersilia has also developed 
performance measures for community corrections. See Joan Petersilia, Measuring the Performance of 
Community Corrections, in PERFORMANCE MEASURES FOR THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 286, at 
60, 77–78. But many of these are input measures (“Number and type of supervision contacts”), output 
measures (“Number of hours/days performed community service”), or outcome measures that can be easily 
gamed (“Number of arrests and technical violation[s] during supervision”). Id. at 77–78. 
 317 Logan, supra note 316, at 27–32.  
 318 Id. at 34. 
 319 Id. 
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And, finally, Logan decomposes these subdimensions into specific 
numerical measures: number of escapes, proportion of staff who have observed 
staff ignoring inmate misconduct, ratio of resident population to security staff, 
drug-related incidents, and so on.320 In all—over all eight dimensions—there 
are a few hundred measures.321 Logan used this index to evaluate three 
women’s prisons in New Mexico and West Virginia.322 
None of Logan’s measures involve how many inmates get rehabilitated. 
But this is also intentional. First, actual rehabilitation is out of the direct 
control of prisons. Logan has a preference for measuring things that are within 
prisons’ “direct sphere of influence”;323 what we measure “ought to be 
achievable and measurable mostly within the prison itself.”324 Second, 
including rehabilitation endorses the rehabilitative model of criminal 
punishment, and Logan makes it clear that his model is retributive, not 
rehabilitative.325 Prisons, in his view, shouldn’t “add to (any more  
than . . . avoid or . . . compensate for) the pain and suffering inherent in being 
forcibly separated from civil society[;] . . . coercive confinement carries with it 
an obligation to meet the basic needs of prisoners at a reasonable standard of 
decency.”326 
Logan’s concern for focusing on what a prison can control and focusing on 
the retributive goal merge in the following statement: “a prison does not have 
to justify itself as a tool of rehabilitation or crime control or any other 
instrumental purpose at which an army of critics will forever claim it to be a 
failure.”327 (Of course “[i]t would be very nice if the prison programs [counted 
in the ‘activity’ dimension] had rehabilitative effects,” and perhaps they do, but 
whether they do or don’t doesn’t enter into the index.)328 
Fair enough. What this illustrates is that you can’t judge particular 
measures to be desirable unless you have a normative theory that proclaims 
certain goals to be desirable, and such a political discussion is necessary before 
 
 320 Id. at 42–43. 
 321 See id. at 42–57. 
 322 See LOGAN, supra note 61, at 7–11, 13, 17; Logan, supra note 61, at 577–78, 583 fig.1. 
 323 Logan, supra note 316, at 24. 
 324 Id. 
 325 Id. at 19, 21, 24. 
 326 Id. at 25.  
 327 Id. at 26. 
 328 Id. at 29 n.7. 
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one can commit oneself to a particular form of performance measures.329 
“[W]ithout declared goals, we cannot hold a jurisdiction accountable, and 
performance measurement is meaningless.”330 
This normative issue arises wherever performance measurements are used. 
John DiIulio describes how John Chubb and Terry Moe “measure school 
performance strictly in terms of pupils’ achievements on a battery of 
standardized tests, accepting the schools’ value as instruments of socialization 
and civics training as important but secondary.”331 On the relative value of test 
scores vs. socialization, your mileage may vary. 
Likewise, for the correctional system, there is a great variety of available 
goals;332 prisons should punish, rehabilitate, deter, incapacitate, and 
reintegrate—all, says John DiIulio, “without violating the public conscience 
(humane treatment), jeopardizing the public law (constitutional rights), 
emptying the public purse (cost containment), or weakening the tradition of 
State and local public administration (federalism).”333 So we need to have a 
political discussion about what the appropriate goals are. 
One’s normative theory also affects whether a particular measure is an 
output or an outcome; this classification,334 which I’ve been using casually so 
far as if it were value-neutral, is in fact anything but. If we didn’t care about 
inmates but only cared about the outside world, perhaps only recidivism would 
be relevant. The quality of living conditions or inmate literacy would merely 
be outputs, which we would care about only to the extent that they affected 
recidivism; they wouldn’t need to independently enter the compensation 
function as long as we already counted recidivism. But we might 
independently care about inmates’ living conditions for many reasons; if we 
do, living conditions become an actual outcome of the system. 
 
 329 John DiIulio thus seems incorrect when he states that Logan’s work “dispels the worry that any such 
measurement scheme is bound to be based exclusively on one or another moral or ideological view of the 
‘ends of criminal justice’” and that his measures “encompass and satisfy every major school of thought about 
‘what prisons are for.’” DiIulio, supra note 286, at 152. 
 330 GAES ET AL., supra note 7, at xii. 
 331 DiIulio, supra note 307, at 129, 131 (citing JOHN E. CHUBB & TERRY M. MOE, POLITICS, MARKETS, 
AND AMERICA’S SCHOOLS (1990)); see also John E. Chubb, Why the Current Wave of School Reform Will 
Fail, PUB. INTEREST, Winter 1988, at 28. 
 332 See GAES ET AL., supra note 7, at 10–16 tbl.1.1; see also supra text accompanying note 291. 
 333 John J. DiIulio, Jr., Rethinking the Criminal Justice System: Toward a New Paradigm, in 
PERFORMANCE MEASURES FOR THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 286, at 1, 6 (italics omitted). 
 334 See supra text accompanying note 17. 
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Thus, some of Logan’s dimensions, like “activity,” which I’m inclined to 
call an output measure,335 might be an outcome measure given Logan’s 
normative perspective. The same goes for variables like prison employees’ job 
satisfaction336 (which I consider an output measure because it’s only 
instrumentally relevant to prison quality, but which others who care about 
labor conditions might treat differently) or whether inmates have difficulty 
concentrating337 (which—unlike, say, overcrowding or physical safety338—
many may not consider an appropriate dimension for prison evaluation). 
Some of the measures, though, for instance the number of urinalysis tests 
conducted based on suspicion, are output measures under any definition, and 
these have the problem that it’s ambiguous whether they’re good or bad. Do 
we want more or fewer urinalysis tests based on suspicion? More tests could 
mean that drug use has gone up; or it could mean that prison authorities are 
getting more serious about controlling drug use. Even worse, prison 
authorities’ stringency is something prison authorities themselves can control; 
this is a serious problem, which I discuss below.339 
As a final note, I’ll mention that while it’s vitally important to have good 
cost measures that are adequate for comparing public and private prisons, it’s 
not necessary to include cost in the private contractor’s compensation. If we 
couldn’t measure quality, perhaps there would be a role for rate-of-return 
regulation, which might at least limit some of the private sector’s harmful cost-
cutting tendencies.340 But if we’re going to engage in quality measurement, we 
might as well enforce quality directly by getting the rewards or penalties 
“right”;341 let the private firms worry about their own costs.342 
 
 335 See DiIulio, supra note 286, at 152 (distinguishing between certain “process measures” and certain 
“performance measures” within Logan’s “security” dimension); see also Gaes, supra note 36, at 23 
(“[J]urisdictions that buy prison services are most concerned about internal performance measures such as 
order, health, case management, program services, and safety.”). 
 336 See supra text accompanying note 315. 
 337 Ross et al., supra note 313, at 464 tbl.4. 
 338 See supra text accompanying notes 313–14. 
 339 See infra Part III.C.2. 
 340 Cf. W. KIP VISCUSI ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 430–36 (4th ed. 2005) 
(discussing the theory of traditional rate-of-return regulation, primarily in the context of electric utilities). 
 341 See infra Part III.A. 
 342 Cf. Shapiro & Steinzor, supra note 223, at 1767 (questioning whether reducing regulatory cost to the 
private sector should be a GPRA performance measure for the FDA). 
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III.  CONCERNS AND CRITIQUES 
Despite the advantages discussed in the previous section, the use of 
performance measures has its pitfalls. 
One concern, so obvious as not to merit its own section heading, is the 
issue of administrative costs. Recidivism-based contracts require one to track 
released prisoners adequately. Perhaps there would be substantial startup 
costs343—though current probation and parole systems already track releases 
and monitor employment, recidivism, and other relevant outcomes, so at least 
some of these costs are already sunk. Moreover, if performance-based 
contracting is beneficial at all, its benefits are probably great enough that these 
startup costs are worthwhile.344 
This Part focuses on other concerns and critiques. First, there is the concern 
that one can’t set the proper prices in a theoretically defensible way. Second, 
there’s the concern that performance-based compensation will affect market 
structure, either by driving out the public-interested or by driving out the risk-
averse. Third, there’s the concern that performance-based compensation will 
lead to undesirable strategic behavior, for instance via manipulation of the 
choice of performance goals, by distorting effort across various dimensions of 
performance, by distorting effort across various types of inmate, and by 
encouraging outright falsification. 
A. What Prices to Set 
The focus on performance measures might seem grating to those who 
criticize the turn toward efficiency analysis and comparative effectiveness and 
stress moral considerations.345 But one can support performance measures 
without endorsing efficiency in any way—in fact, as a better way of achieving 
particular moral goals. 
 
 343 See Durham, supra note 20, at 66; see also id. at 67 (“‘At none of the sites we examined were attempts 
made by government to evaluate rehabilitative success.’” (quoting JUDITH HACKETT ET AL., ISSUES IN 
CONTRACTING FOR THE PRIVATE OPERATION OF PRISONS AND JAILS 48 (1987))). 
 344 Cf. Low, supra note 222, at 64; Alexander Volokh, Prison Vouchers, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 779, 834 
(2012). One might also measure a random sample of inmates, see Low, supra note 222, at 46 n.298, though 
this might exacerbate risk issues. See infra Part III.B.2. 
 345 Sharon Dolovich critiques “comparative efficiency” analysis and stresses moral considerations, see, 
e.g., Dolovich, supra note 3; Dolovich, supra note 5, though to my knowledge she hasn’t opined on 
performance measures. 
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I myself have been critical of a focus on efficiency in the context of 
regulatory cost–benefit analysis,346 another example of hard-numbers-based 
accountability. To restate the problems of cost–benefit analysis in the prison 
context: What’s the social value of having less recidivism? To ask this in an 
economic context, we’d have to know either the maximum amount people 
would be willing to pay to reduce crime, or the minimum amount people 
would accept to acquiesce in an increase in crime. These are in general 
different amounts, and the choice between them is value-laden.347 Suppose we 
choose one of these numbers to measure; we may find that, when surveyed, 
some people—who reject the very notion of paying or being paid for 
reductions or increases in crime—give answers of zero or infinity for their 
willingness to pay or accept; the number we’re seeking may just not exist for 
these people.348 Some people may have true willingness to pay or accept, but 
they don’t even know what these numbers are: we only come to know such 
numbers because of our experience paying for and consuming goods and 
services in the real world, but increases and decreases in crime generally aren’t 
traded in markets. So the very act of asking for the number may bring some 
number into being, but there’s no reason to suppose it’s accurate.349 Or, people 
may know the number, but there’s no incentive for them to truthfully reveal it 
in surveys. 
Even if we use non-survey-based estimation methods—How much higher 
are house prices in lower-crime areas? How much do people pay to avoid 
crime?—econometric analysis isn’t good enough to give us the correct 
number.350 The political process is also likely to manipulate the numbers.351 
Moreover, concerns that are hard to quantify can be systematically slighted.352 
In short, “[w]hile cost–benefit analysis may look like rationality, perhaps 
it’s merely rationalism.”353 And these are just the problems for people who 
accept the utilitarian basis of cost–benefit analysis. The problems for those 
 
 346 See Alexander Volokh, Rationality or Rationalism? The Positive and Normative Flaws of Cost–Benefit 
Analysis, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 79 (2011). 
 347 See id. at 82–83. 
 348 See id. at 84. 
 349 See id. at 85–86. 
 350 See id. at 86–88. 
 351 See, e.g., Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless: Cost–Benefit Analysis of 
Environmental Protection, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1553, 1580 (2002) (explaining that regulated industry has an 
incentive to overstate costs). 
 352 See id. at 1579–80. This gives rise to potentially serious strategic behavior, which I address in infra 
Part III.C.2. 
 353 Volokh, supra note 346, at 88. 
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who reject utilitarianism as a moral philosophy are even greater.354 Surely 
corrections policy, of all things, should be decided with respect to morality and 
human values rather than numbers? 
These are real problems with cost–benefit analysis, and they potentially 
infect performance-based contracting as well. Setting the incentives in a 
performance-based contract means either setting the relative weights of every 
component of performance,355 or (equivalently) setting the separate rewards or 
penalties for every component of performance.356 Getting the prices “right,” in 
an efficiency sense, requires knowing the social value of the different 
components of performance;357 if that social value doesn’t exist or can’t be 
measured, it’s an impossible task. 
I agree and disagree with this critique. 
As to the moral objection, even though moral values have an extremely 
important place in criminal law and policy, I have no essential problem with 
using economic incentives to improve outcomes in the process. I’ve argued 
elsewhere that the valid arguments for or against private prisons generally are 
essentially empirical;358 measuring performance is an essential part of that 
debate, even though the choice of outcomes to measure is a value-laden 
enterprise;359 and attaching incentives to those performance measures is 
eminently justifiable if the result is a morally more just correctional system. 
As to the theoretical incoherence objection, I’m sympathetic. But the 
enterprise can still be salvaged if we adopt a humble attitude.360 Rather than 
 
 354 See id. at 88–91. 
 355 See supra note 291 and accompanying text. 
 356 These two approaches are identical. Let xi be the ith component of performance and pi be the reward 
for that component. Then the total performance-based component of compensation is Σpixi. Let P be the sum 
of the prices (P = Σpi). Then the performance-based component of compensation can be expressed as 
P Σ(pi/P)xi = P Σwixi, where wi = pi/P is the weight placed on the ith component of performance and P is the 
price attached to the overall performance index Σwixi. 
 357 Not that the price necessarily has to be equal to the social value—paying the price requires incurring 
the deadweight losses involved in raising tax money, and making incentives so high-powered might make the 
contract too risky. See infra Part III.B.2 for a discussion of optimal risk allocation. But at least the optimal 
prices (or at least the relative optimal prices of the different components of performance), from an efficiency 
perspective, will probably bear some relation to social value. 
 358 See generally Volokh, supra note 6. 
 359 See supra text accompanying notes 329–32. 
 360 Cf. Christopher C. DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Rationalism in Regulation, 108 MICH. L. REV. 
877, 885 (2010) (reviewing RICHARD L. REVESZ & MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE, RETAKING RATIONALITY: HOW 
COST–BENEFIT ANALYSIS CAN BETTER PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT AND OUR HEALTH (2008)) (stating that 
Richard Revesz and Michael Livermore “regard regulatory cost-benefit analysis as a device for social 
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trying to achieve incentives that are correct in some abstract sense,361 we can 
just try to muddle through and ameliorate the problems of the current system 
by attaching some weight to factors that traditionally haven’t been rewarded. 
None of this requires buying into the efficiency norm.362 Maybe the weights 
will be wrong, but “[t]he basic question . . . is whether the dangers of providing 
improper incentives through imperfect models outweigh the benefits of 
providing program direction and accountability.”363 Is adding this element of 
imperfect, numbers-based accountability better than not? The remaining 
sections in this Part address this question. 
B. Effects on Market Structure 
This section discusses how performance-based compensation can change 
the composition of providers. First, it will attract providers who respond better 
to market incentives, which might affect the overall public-interestedness of 
the industry. Second, because performance-based compensation is riskier than 
flat-rate compensation, it will discourage the more risk-averse providers. 
1. Public-Interestedness 
Todd Henderson and Fred Tung address this concern in the context of 
performance-based compensation for regulators. If regulators are currently 
public-interested, introducing market incentives might change the culture 
within the agency. “Once diligence has been priced, perhaps some regulators 
will slack.”364 
This form of compensation will also affect the mix of people who choose to 
be regulators. “Public service motives might be displaced by financial 
motivations among new hires . . . . Eventually, the composition of the 
regulatory agency could change for the worse.”365 
 
engineering. . . . Our view of cost-benefit analysis is much more modest. . . . [W]e think that many important 
political questions . . . cannot be effectively decided by cost-benefit analysis.”). 
 361 See DiIulio, supra note 286, at 146. 
 362 See Barnow, supra note 230, at 279. 
 363 Id. at 307; see also M. Todd Henderson & Frederick Tung, Paying Bank Examiners for Performance, 
REGULATION, Spring 2012, at 32, 36 (“We . . . make no attempt to offer firm prescriptions for the optimal ratio 
[between debt and equity]. The mix should induce regulators to care about bank profits but not at the expense 
of risk shifting to creditors.”). 
 364 M. Todd Henderson & Frederick Tung, Pay for Regulator Performance, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1003, 
1056–57 (2012). 
 365 Id. at 1057. 
VOLOKH GALLEYSPROOFS 1/21/2014  4:05 PM 
2013] PRISON ACCOUNTABILITY AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES 397 
Henderson and Tung conclude, citing the crowding out literature,366 that 
this is possible, though not necessary: “public spiritedness and financial reward 
[might not be] mutually exclusive, at least up to a point.”367 Moreover, 
changing the mix of individuals “could be a good,” given the failures of the 
current crop of people.368 
The same arguments can be applied to performance-based compensation 
for prison providers. I would add that, to the extent we’re considering 
performance-based compensation for private firms rather than public 
servants,369 we don’t need to worry about making providers any more 
mercenary than they already are: if there’s one thing advocates and opponents 
of private prisons agree on, it’s that private prison providers are a profit-
oriented bunch. Not that the profit motive is inconsistent with public-
interestedness: public servants “profit” from their employment too without 
being accused of thereby necessarily becoming mercenaries;370 moreover, 
corrections professionals move between the public and private sectors and 
presumably take their professionalism with them. Finally, as I discuss further 
below,371 performance-based compensation, combined with social impact 
bonds, allows nonprofits to raise money from private investors, so to this 
extent, introducing the profit motive may turn out to be a great boon for 
charitable and public-interested providers. 
2. Risk and Capital Requirements 
a. The Risk Is in the Slope 
We’ve seen, in the discussion of Charles Logan’s approach above,372 the 
concern that performance measures be based on factors that the relevant actor 
can actually control. Such concerns crop up frequently;373 James Q. Wilson 
even says, in the context of police departments, that public order and safety 
aren’t “‘real’ measures of overall success” because whatever about them is 
 
 366 Id. at 1057 n.182 (citing Ernst Fehr & Armin Falk, Psychological Foundations of Incentives, 46 EUR. 
ECON. REV. 687, 688 (2002); Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine Is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 14 
(2000)). 
 367 Id. at 1057. 
 368 Id. 
 369 But see supra Part II.C.3 (discussing possibilities for merit pay for public prison wardens). 
 370 See Volokh, supra note 6, at 178–85. 
 371 See infra Part III.B.2. 
 372 See supra text accompanying notes 316–28  
 373 See, e.g., DICKER, supra note 123, at 17; GRIZZLE ET AL., supra note 241, at 48–49; Petersilia, supra 
note 316, at 66. 
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measurable “can only partially, if at all, be affected by police behavior.”374 
When he does favor a “micro-level measure of success” of whether the 
neighborhood is becoming safer and more orderly,375 he still limits it to cases 
where the level of danger and disorder is “amenable . . . to improvement by a 
given, feasible level of police and public action.”376 The concern in the 
literature over controlling for baselines is similarly motivated.377 
This seems mistaken: overall public order and safety are measures of the 
success of police departments, and (given that prison programs and conditions 
affect recidivism to some extent378) lower recidivism is a measure of the 
success of prisons.379 It’s true that these measures come with a lot of noise 
attached—that is, with a lot of omitted variables reflecting the contribution of 
other people’s efforts, as well as environmental variables.380 But that doesn’t 
mean it’s wrong to use them for purposes of accountability, or even to tie 
compensation to them. 
There are two concerns about using these noisy measures: first, that the 
level of the unobserved variables at the beginning of the contract might 
establish a high-recidivism baseline, for which the contractor will have to be 
 
 374 James Q. Wilson, The Problem of Defining Agency Success, in PERFORMANCE MEASURES FOR THE 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 286, at 156, 159; see also DiIulio, supra note 333, at 1–2, 13. 
 375 Wilson, supra note 374, at 160–62. 
 376 Id. at 161. 
 377 See supra text accompanying notes 240–50. 
 378 See Camp et al., supra note 99; M. Keith Chen & Jesse M. Shapiro, Do Harsher Prison Conditions 
Reduce Recidivism? A Discontinuity-Based Approach, 9 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1, 17–21 (2007); DiIulio, supra 
note 333, at 2; Francesco Drago et al., Prison Conditions and Recidivism, 13 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 103, 120–
25 (2011); Daniel S. Nagin et al., Imprisonment and Reoffending, in 38 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF 
RESEARCH 115, 115 (Michael Tonry ed., 2009); Rafael Di Tella & Ernesto Schargrodsky, Criminal Recidivism 
After Prison and Electronic Monitoring 28 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15602, 
2009), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w15602.pdf; see also GAES ET AL., supra note 7, at 124 (citing 
ROBERT J. SAMPSON & JOHN H. LAUB, CRIME IN THE MAKING: PATHWAYS AND TURNING POINTS THROUGH 
LIFE (1993); Shawn D. Bushway et al., An Empirical Framework for Studying Desistance as a Process, 39 
CRIMINOLOGY 491 (2001); Jeffrey Grogger, The Effect of Arrest on the Employment and Earnings of Young 
Men, 110 Q.J. ECON. 51 (1995); Jeffrey R. Kling, The Effect of Prison Sentence Length on the Subsequent 
Employment and Earnings of Criminal Defendants (Woodrow Wilson Sch., Discussion Paper No. 208, 1999)); 
id. at 129 (citing Alex R. Piquero et al., Assessing the Impact of Exposure Time and Incapacitation on 
Longitudinal Trajectories of Criminal Offending, 16 J. ADOLESCENT RES. 54 (2001)); id. at 136 (citing Gerald 
G. Gaes & Newton Kendig, The Skill Sets and Health Care Needs of Released Offenders, in PAPERS PREPARED 
FOR THE “FROM PRISON TO HOME” CONFERENCE 93 (2002), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/ 
410629_ReleasedOffenders.pdf). 
 379 DiIulio, supra note 333, at 5 (“[C]rime rates and recidivism rates are indeed important[, though not the 
only,] measures of the system’s performance, which ought to be continually used and refined.”). 
 380 See Barnow, supra note 230, at 281 (explaining that these are “gross outcome measures . . . in the 
sense that they do not necessarily reflect gains from the program”). 
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compensated very highly, or a low-recidivism baseline, for which the 
contractor will collect more than it deserves; and second, that variation in the 
unobserved variables might create a lot of risk for the contractor.381 
As to the first concern, recall the earlier discussion about whether to control 
for baselines.382 Whether or not we adjust the contract price to take into 
account the baseline expected level of performance should have little effect on 
government expenditures: a high baseline translates into less quality being 
attributed to the contractor and thus to lower payments, and so the contractor 
will demand more money at the bidding stage, and vice versa. 
The same reasoning addresses the second concern: because controlling for 
baselines doesn’t affect the contractor’s payout—it basically amounts to 
adding or subtracting a constant, which is subtracted or added right back at the 
bidding stage—it also doesn’t necessarily affect risk.383 
What definitely affects risk is not the level of compensation, but its slope. 
A contract that compensates the contractor based on the portion of 
performance he was able to control isn’t necessarily less risky than one that 
doesn’t, but a contract where the per-quality-unit price is lower is less risky. 
Thus, in the numerical example discussed earlier,384 a contract with a $1 
reward per quality unit (regardless of the fixed component of the contract) is 
riskier than a contract with a $0.50 reward per quality unit; an even less risky 
contract is one with a $0 reward per quality unit, that is, a fixed-price contract, 
which is close to the norm; and the least risky possible contract is the cost-plus 
contract typical of rate-of-return regulation.385 Compensation based on a 
continuous quality measure is less risky than compensation based on a discrete 
quality measure (as long as the provider has some chance of being on either 
side of the cutoff);386 thus, “$1 for each quality unit” is less risky than “$5 but 
only if you get five quality units.” 
 
 381 See HARDING, supra note 72, at 68 (“[T]he human variables are too volatile for any contractor to be 
expected to stand or fall by outputs alone . . . .”); Lynn, supra note 165, at 12; Kyle, supra note 162, at 2112. 
 382 See supra Part II.C.2.c. 
 383 See supra text accompanying note 255. 
 384 See supra text accompanying notes 234–38, 251. 
 385 See supra text accompanying note 340. 
 386 See supra text accompanying notes 258–70. 
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Do we care? Perhaps large corporations like CCA or The GEO Group, 
which are publicly traded387 and diversified across many contracts,388 can 
handle the risk; and they cover three-quarters of the industry.389 Smaller, 
privately held companies like MTC390 may be more sensitive to risk. Various 
potential entrants, especially nonprofits,391 must be even more sensitive. 
Adopting high-powered (i.e., high-slope) contracts may scare away the most 
risk-sensitive potential bidders, leaving the field to a few large corporations. 
(And it isn’t just a matter of risk: if the fixed part of the contract is paid up 
front while the reward is paid later, possibly a few years later once recidivism 
statistics come in, this might disadvantage small companies or nonprofits with 
limited access to capital markets.)392 This has potential implications for the 
competitiveness of the industry,393 possibilities for innovation,394 and the 
political influence that drives changes in criminal law.395 
 
 387 See Who We Are, CCA, http://www.cca.com/who-we-are (last visited Dec. 12, 2013) (noting that CCA 
joined the NYSE in 1994); Historic Milestones, GEO GROUP, http://www.geogroup.com/history (last visited 
Dec. 12, 2013) (noting that GEO joined the NYSE in 1996). 
 388 See Who We Are, supra note 387 (“CCA houses nearly 80,000 inmates in more than 60  
facilities . . . . CCA currently partners with all three federal corrections agencies . . . , many states[,] and local 
municipalities.”); Who We Are, GEO GROUP, http://www.geogroup.com/about_us (last visited Dec. 12, 2013) 
(“GEO’s operations include the management and/or ownership of 96 correctional, detention and residential 
treatment facilities encompassing approximately 73,000 beds.”). 
 389 See Volokh, supra note 9, at 1237 & n.182 (relying on data from 1999). 
 390 See id. (noting a 5%–8% share for MTC in 1999); Overview, MGMT. & TRAINING CORP., http://www. 
mtctrains.com/about-mtc/overview (last visited Dec. 12, 2013) (“Management & Training Corporation (MTC) 
is a privately- held company . . . .”).  
 391 For discussions of the possibility of nonprofit prisons, see Low, supra note 222, at 4, and Richard 
Moran, Op-Ed., A Third Option: Nonprofit Prisons, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1997, § 1, at 23. Compare with 
discussions of the advantages of nonprofit schools. See Byron W. Brown, Why Governments Run Schools, 11 
ECON. EDUC. REV. 287, 293–96 (1992); John Morley, Note, For-Profit and Nonprofit Charter Schools: An 
Agency Costs Approach, 115 YALE L.J. 1782, 1795–1810 (2006); cf. also Education: Raising the Bar, 
ECONOMIST, June 15–21, 2013, at 30 (discussing risk issues for schools and teachers resulting from 
educational accountability schemes). 
 392 NICHOLSON, supra note 216, at 6 (“The working capital requirements of a [payment-by-results] system 
will cause problems for Small and Medium Sized Enterprises and the third sector [i.e., nonprofits] in bidding 
for contracts.”). 
 393 DICKER, supra note 123, at 24 (explaining that high incentives, through high risk, will “reduce the 
diversity of the market” by making it less attractive for nonprofits or small companies). 
 394 Id. at 23. On the relationship between market concentration and innovation, see Richard Gilbert, 
Looking for Mr. Schumpeter: Where Are We in the Competition–Innovation Debate, in 6 INNOVATION POLICY 
AND THE ECONOMY 159 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2006), for an argument that the relationship is inconclusive. 
 395 See Volokh, supra note 9, at 1213–14 (arguing that the degree of concentration of the industry can 
affect the political influence the industry exerts); see also Volokh, Privatization, Free Riding, supra note 142, 
at 64; Volokh, The Effect of Privatization, supra note 142, at 10–11. 
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But the contract doesn’t have to be especially high-stakes.396 The optimal 
level of risk transfer is probably less than 100%. Rewarding the contractor for 
increases in quality with a price equal to the social value of quality gives the 
contractor great incentives but also (since the per-unit reward will be high) 
subjects him to high risk.397 Flat-fee contracts are relatively low risk398 but also 
low incentive. Some moderate level of risk transfer will optimally balance 
incentives with risk.399 Thus, the incentive-based portion of the contract is only 
10% of the contract price in U.K.’s Doncaster prison,400 and was only 5% in 
the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ Taft demonstration project.401 Recall that in 
Britain’s Job Deal program, 30% of the payment is conditional, and only a 
third of that is related to “hard outcomes,” and even some of those outcomes 
are slightly “soft.”402 
For the cash-flow issue noted above,403 one can also “change the timing of 
payments to providers,” for instance by making “a payment every six months 
for each offender who has not been reconvicted.”404 
b. Financing Nonprofits: Social Impact Bonds 
The need to encourage the nonprofit sector calls for innovative funding 
mechanisms. Nonprofit prisons have been suggested405 though never 
implemented.406 But in light of the widespread concern that private prison 
firms will cut quality to save money,407 the nonprofit form seems like an 
obvious alternative. 
Ed Glaeser and Andrei Shleifer discuss the value of nonprofit status: by 
weakening the provider’s incentives to maximize profits, nonprofit status can 
 
 396 DICKER, supra note 123, at 6. 
 397 See supra note 357. 
 398 Though not zero-risk: recall that the least risky contracts are cost-plus. See supra text accompanying 
note 385. 
 399 See DICKER, supra note 123, at 23–24; NICHOLSON, supra note 216, at 6–7; see also BOLTON & 
DEWATRIPONT, supra note 256, at 13 (“[W]hen both employer and employee are risk averse, they will 
optimally share business risk.”). 
 400 See Johnson, supra note 209. 
 401 See supra text accompanying note 172. 
 402 See supra text accompanying note 218. 
 403 See supra text accompanying note 392. 
 404 DICKER, supra note 123, at 24. 
 405 See sources cited supra note 391. 
 406 See Low, supra note 222, at 4–5 (suggesting creation of nonprofit prisons on “an experimental basis”). 
 407 See, e.g., Dolovich, supra note 5, at 474–80. 
VOLOKH GALLEYSPROOFS 1/21/2014  4:05 PM 
402 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 63:339 
be a valuable signal of quality when quality itself is nonverifiable.408 (Even 
using performance measures, it’s reasonable to suppose that some aspects of 
quality will remain nonverifiable; the value of nonprofit status depends on how 
important these remaining nonverifiable components are.)409 Moreover, 
altruistic entrepreneurs will tend to be attracted to the nonprofit form.410 
And Timothy Besley and Maitreesh Ghatak show that, when both a 
provider and the government can make productive investments in a project, 
and when the provider is altruistic, then the provider should own the project if 
it values it more than the government does.411 Privatization can thus be more 
beneficial in the presence of altruistic providers. 
But banks or private equity houses are unlikely to finance such nonprofits, 
especially when the nonprofits don’t have much of a track record.412 
Social impact bonds have been proposed as a funding mechanism for 
nonprofits.413 Rather than contracting directly with a provider, the government 
contracts with a middleman. This middleman, a “social impact bond-issuing 
organization,”414 has two functions. First, it hires the staff to provide the 
service. Second, it sells bonds to investors, particularly philanthropic ones;415 
these bonds are essentially claims to a portion of the performance-based 
compensation. If the service provider fulfills the performance-based goals and 
receives its reward from the government, the investors make money; otherwise 
they don’t.416 At the Peterborough prison in the U.K., the government doesn’t 
pay anything unless recidivism is 7.5% less than in a comparison group,417 and 
payments are capped when the difference reaches 13%.418 The provider’s 
 
 408 Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, Not-for-Profit Entrepreneurs, 81 J. PUB. ECON. 99, 102 (2001). 
 409 See infra Part III.C.2. 
 410 Glaeser & Shleifer, supra note 408, at 102. 
 411 See Timothy Besley & Maitreesh Ghatak, Government Versus Private Ownership of Public Goods, 
116 Q.J. ECON. 1343, 1347 (2001). 
 412 NICHOLSON, supra note 216, at 6–7. 
 413 JEFFREY B. LIEBMAN, SOCIAL IMPACT BONDS: A PROMISING NEW FINANCING MODEL TO ACCELERATE 
SOCIAL INNOVATION AND IMPROVE GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE 2 (2011); see also Cullen et al., supra note 
13, at 88–89; Michaels, supra note 276, at 1052–58; Shifali Baliga, Note, Shaping the Success of Social 
Impact Bonds in the United States: Lessons Learned from the Privatization of U.S. Prisons, 63 DUKE L.J. 437 
(2013). 
 414 LIEBMAN, supra note 413, at 2 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 415 Though social impact bonds in the United States have been funded by non-philanthropic types such as 
Goldman Sachs. See Social Impact Bonds: Being Good Pays, ECONOMIST, Aug. 18–24, 2012, at 28. 
 416 LIEBMAN, supra note 413, at 2. 
 417 Id. 
 418 See supra note 213 and accompanying text. 
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employees may well be paid something like a flat wage, so their monetary 
incentives aren’t great; but the bond-issuing organization and the philanthropic 
investors (whose money is on the line) are probably better at monitoring the 
staff than the government would be.419 It remains to be seen, though, whether 
the philanthropic sector will provide enough funds for nonprofit prison 
providers to be a viable alternative to for-profit corporations.420 
C. Undesirable Strategic Behavior 
Perhaps the biggest disadvantage of using performance-based 
compensation is the strategic behavior it may spawn. This strategic behavior 
may come in several flavors. First, there is the possibility of manipulating the 
performance goals themselves. Second, effort may be distorted away from 
some dimensions and toward others. Third, effort may be distorted away from 
some groups of inmates and toward others. And fourth, performance measures 
may simply be falsified. 
1. Manipulating the Goals 
The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993421 is one example 
of a recent effort to inject performance measures into government agencies that 
hasn’t lived up to the hopes of its supporters. 
One of the problems was that setting the performance goals was left to the 
agencies that were to be evaluated. Agencies “tr[ied] to protect themselves by 
devising euphemistic performance goals in order to ensure that they [could] 
‘pass’ their own grading criteria.”422 The Patent and Trademark Office, faced 
with rising backlogs, set itself progressively longer targets of “average total 
pendency” from year to year, rising from 27.7 months in fiscal year 2003 to 
 
 419 See infra text accompanying note 459. 
 420 See NICHOLSON, supra note 216, at 16, 18; Big Hurdles to Be Overcome if Social Impact Bonds to 
Move from Margins of Public Services, Says Think Tank, SOC. MARKET FOUND. (July 31, 2013), http://www. 
smf.co.uk/media/news/big-hurdles-be-overcome-if-social-impact-bonds-move-margins-public-services-says-
think-tank/; Tom Clougherty, Pioneering Social Impact Bonds in the United Kingdom, REASON FOUND. (Aug. 
13, 2013), http://reason.org/news/show/pioneering-social-impact-bonds. 
 421 Pub. L. No. 103-62, 107 Stat. 285 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 and 31 U.S.C.); see 
supra note 165. 
 422 Shapiro & Steinzor, supra note 223, at 1744; see also id. at 1760 (“[A]gencies compelled to function 
in an antiregulatory, even hostile, political atmosphere are predictably reluctant to tell the truth to power. 
Instead, their goal has become convincing congressional and White House overseers that they are performing 
well despite budgets that are inadequate for effective implementation of their missions.”). 
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29.8 months in 2004, 31.0 months in 2005, and 31.3 months in 2006.423 John 
DiIulio had warned of a similar danger: “that measurement-driven government 
workers will, so to speak, ‘set up the target in order to facilitate shooting.’”424 
The similar problem was observed in the U.K., where “Next Steps agencies,” a 
type of performance-based organization, set their own targets, which often 
reflected merely an incremental improvement rather than an assessment of 
what was possible.425 
Why would agencies set goals in such unambitious ways? Perhaps because 
agencies feared being punished for bad performance with budget cuts.426 
Various politicians have indeed suggested that agencies’ funding be tied to 
their performance results,427 and agencies’ performance results have indeed 
been relevant to the administration’s budget proposals,428 so this fear may have 
been reasonable—though it’s also possible that performance scores have 
merely given political cover for cuts to programs that the administration 
wanted to defund for other reasons.429 On the other hand, the link between 
funding and performance results isn’t that tight,430 so agencies’ concern to look 
good may also have been a matter of good public relations. 
 
 423 Schoen, supra note 165, at 480. 
 424 DiIulio, supra note 286, at 154. 
 425 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 223, at 7. 
 426 Shapiro & Steinzor, supra note 223, at 1744. 
 427 See Schoen, supra note 165, at 464 (citing The Results Act: Are We Getting Results?: Hearings Before 
the H. Comm. on Gov’t Reform & Oversight, 105th Cong. 20 (1997) (statement of Rep. Richard K. Armey, H. 
Majority Leader)); id. at 465 (citing Seven Years of GPRA: Has the Results Act Provided Results?: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Gov’t Mgmt., Info., & Tech. of the H. Comm. on Gov’t Reform, 106th Cong. 20 
(2000) (statement of Rep. Pete Sessions, Chairman, H. Results Caucus)); id. at 466–67 (citing OFFICE OF 
MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE PRESIDENT’S MANAGEMENT AGENDA (2002), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2002/mgmt.pdf). 
 428 See Eileen Norcross & Joseph Adamson, An Analysis of the Office of Management and Budget’s 
Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) for Fiscal Year 2008, at 25 (unpublished working paper), 
http://mercatus.org/sites/default/files/publication/20070725_Analysis_of_PART_for_FY_2008.pdf; Eileen 
Norcross & Kyle McKenzie, An Analysis of the Office of Management and Budget’s Program Assessment 
Rating Tool (PART) for Fiscal Year 2007, at 22 (May 2006) (unpublished working paper), http://mercatus. 
org/sites/default/files/publication/PDF__An_Analysis_of_the_Office_of_Management_of_Budgets_Program_
Assessment_Rating_Tool_for_FY_2007.pdf. 
 429 See John B. Gilmour & David E. Lewis, Does Performance Budgeting Work? An Examination of the 
Office of Management & Budget’s PART Scores, 66 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 742, 751 (2006); Norcross & 
Adamson, supra note 428, at 29–30. 
 430 See, e.g., Teresa Curristine, Reforming the U.S. Department of Transportation: Challenges and 
Opportunities of the Government Performance and Results Act for Federal-State Relations, PUBLIUS, Winter 
2002, at 25, 42; Jerry Ellig, Has GPRA Increased the Availability and Use of Performance Information? 5 
(George Mason Univ. Mercatus Ctr., Working Paper No. 09-03, 2009).  
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The problem here is that agencies were allowed to think up their own 
performance goals; that they weren’t required to meet those goals (and indeed, 
that often the performance information simply wasn’t used in 
decisionmaking431); and that the goals were binary rather than continuous 
outcome measures,432 for example, that the EPA “will ‘achieve and maintain at 
least 95 percent of the maximum score on readiness evaluation criteria in each 
region’”433 or “‘complete an additional 975 Superfund-lead hazardous 
substance removal actions.’”434 
These problems have easy fixes, though perhaps they weren’t so easy in the 
context of the GPRA, where the problem was primarily giving performance 
incentives to public agencies. Prison contracts—or merit pay systems for 
public prison wardens435—should be set by the Department of Corrections or 
the relevant contracting authority; goals shouldn’t be set by those who we want 
to comply with them. No one should be “required” to meet any performance 
standard, but compensation should be tied to these measures; providers’ self-
interest should take care of the rest. And adopting continuous outcome 
measures, rather than binary goals, reduces the ability to choose easy goals: 
one can game “achieve x% recidivism” by setting an appropriately high level 
of x, but it’s harder to game the general effort of reducing recidivism where 
additional reductions are met with additional rewards.436 
 
 431 See Schoen, supra note 165, at 466 (citing 10 Years of GPRA—Results, Demonstrated: Hearings 
Before the Subcomm. on Gov’t Efficiency & Fin. Mgmt. of the H. Comm. on Gov’t Reform, 108th Cong. 4 
(2004) (statement of Rep. Edolphus Towns, Member, Subcomm. on Gov’t Efficiency & Fin. Mgmt. of the H. 
Comm. on Gov’t Reform)); Ellig, supra note 430, at 1 (citing Jerry Ellig & Jerry Brito, Toward a More Perfect 
Union: Regulatory Analysis and Performance Management, 8 FLA. ST. U. BUS. REV. 1 (2009)); id. at 2 (citing 
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-1026T, GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE: LESSONS LEARNED FOR 
THE NEXT ADMINISTRATION ON USING PERFORMANCE INFORMATION TO IMPROVE RESULTS (2008)). 
 432 See supra Part II.C.2.d. 
 433 Shapiro & Steinzor, supra note 223, at 1764 (quoting EPA, 2006–2011 EPA STRATEGIC PLAN: 
CHARTING OUR COURSE 67 (2006), available at http://nepis.epa.gov/Adobe/PDF/P1001IPK.PDF). 
 434 Id. at 1765 (quoting EPA, supra note 433, at 67); see also id. at 1773 (“[A]ttain water quality standards 
for all pollutants and impairments in more than 2,250 water bodies . . . . [R]emove at least 5,600 . . . specific 
causes of water body impairment . . . . [I]mprove water quality conditions in 250 . . . impaired watersheds 
nationwide . . . .” (altered capitalization and third and fifth omissions in original) (quoting EPA, supra note 
433, at 43)). 
 435 See supra Part II.C.3. 
 436 See also Barnow, supra note 230, at 287 (discussing “whether the size of the award should vary with 
the extent to which standards are exceeded”); id. at 291–92 (“The national standards are set, based on 
experience in prior years, so that approximately 75 percent of the nation’s [providers] will exceed the 
standards . . . .”). 
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2. Distortion Across Dimensions of Performance 
Everyone agrees that, in most areas, performance has multiple 
dimensions.437 Each dimension, in a performance-based contract, will have its 
price,438 and the relative prices of different dimensions will determine how the 
contractor will allocate his effort among them.439 
So far, so good, as long as the set of performance measures is complete. 
But what if some dimensions of performance are unmeasurable?440 Just as 
cost–benefit analysis is accused of slighting the soft factors,441 so might 
performance measures be biased in favor of the measurable. The result is that 
the contractor’s work effort will be biased in the direction of increasing the 
measurable dimensions of performance.442 
Consider a hypothetical example involving education. Suppose there are 
two measures of educational quality: “hard” (e.g., knowledge of facts) and 
“soft” (e.g., citizenship, critical thinking, socialization). Without hard 
accountability, it might be hard to give teachers serious incentives, so they will 
slack in their overall work effort, but divide their time between hard and soft 
education in a balanced way. With hard accountability, teachers can get much 
higher-powered incentives, but these incentives will tend to be skewed toward 
the hard measures of education. Thus, the teachers will provide more overall 
work effort, but their time will be skewed toward hard education.443 
How serious is this problem? It depends how important it is to have a 
balance between hard and soft factors, how hard the soft factors really are to 
measure, and how harmful the status quo of low work effort is.444 It also 
 
 437 See supra text accompanying notes 291, 332–33. 
 438 See supra text accompanying note 356. 
 439 See Bengt Holmstrom & Paul Milgrom, Multitask Principal–Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, 
Asset Ownership, and Job Design, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 24, 25 (1991) (“In general, when 
there are multiple tasks, incentive pay serves not only to allocate risks and to motivate hard work, it also serves 
to direct the allocation of the agents’ attention among their various duties.”). 
 440 See supra text accompanying note 352 (noting retributivism as a possible unmeasurable dimension). 
 441 See supra text accompanying note 352. 
 442 See GRIZZLE ET AL., supra note 241, at 50–51. 
 443 See Holmstrom & Milgrom, supra note 439, at 25 (“It would be better, . . . critics argue, to pay a fixed 
wage without any incentive scheme than to base teachers’ compensation only on the limited dimensions of 
student achievement that can be effectively measured.” (italics omitted)); see also Peter Smith, On the 
Unintended Consequences of Publishing Performance Data in the Public Sector, 18 INT’L J. PUB. ADMIN. 277, 
284 (1995) (discussing “tunnel vision”); Education: Raising the Bar, supra note 391. 
 444 See Holmstrom & Milgrom, supra note 439, at 26 (“[T]he desirability of providing incentives for any 
one activity decreases with the difficulty of measuring performance in any other activities that make 
competing demands on the agent’s time and attention.”).  
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depends on whether the one type of education makes the other type easier or 
harder for the teacher; an excessively high-powered accountability system 
focusing, say, on standardized test scores could easily promote a “teaching to 
the test” strategy that can be antithetical to critical thinking (at the very least by 
taking up class time that could be otherwise used);445 this isn’t necessarily so, 
but it may be likely.446 Providing high-powered but skewed accountability may 
be beneficial in severely dysfunctional school systems where neither hard nor 
soft factors are taught well, but it may be harmful in better school systems. 
Analogously, in the prison context, one can imagine two dimensions of 
quality: humane in-prison conditions and low recidivism after prison. Suppose 
one of these is harder to measure than the other. In-prison conditions could be 
harder to measure if effective monitoring is difficult;447 or perhaps recidivism 
is harder to measure if there aren’t good databases of offenders, especially if 
released inmates often commit their crimes in other states. Whichever one 
turns out to be less measurable, we can expect effort to be skewed toward the 
more measurable one. 
Would it make a difference if prison policies were skewed toward humane 
conditions or toward reducing recidivism? If the two go together—if humane 
conditions are, on balance, effective at reducing recidivism448—then the 
inability to monitor both dimensions can be harmless. On the other hand, if bad 
prison conditions, on balance, reduce recidivism through a general deterrent 
effect,449 a focus on recidivism could lead to bad prison conditions—in which 
case there’s no guarantee that high-powered accountability would improve 
overall quality in the absence of effective in-prison monitoring. Since the 
 
 445 This assumes that test scores really are a true outcome measure, even if a partial one. Perhaps this is 
too charitable, though: it may be better to characterize test scores as proxy measures for a type of intelligence, 
and “teaching to the test” as a form of manipulation, as described below. See infra text accompanying note 
457.  
 446 See Holmstrom & Milgrom, supra note 439, at 25; id. at 32–33 (explaining that the desirability of 
incentives for measurable tasks depends on whether measurable and unmeasurable tasks are complements or 
substitutes in an agent’s cost function). 
 447 See infra Part III.C.4. 
 448 See sources cited supra note 378. 
 449 See, e.g., Kelly Bedard & Eric Helland, The Location of Women’s Prisons and the Deterrence Effect of 
“Harder” Time, 24 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 147, 159–61 (2004); Lawrence Katz et al., Prison Conditions, 
Capital Punishment, and Deterrence, 5 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 318, 331 (2003); Volokh, supra note 344, at 
843–45. But see TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 64 (1990) (“The most important normative 
influence on compliance with the law is the person’s assessment that following the law accords with his or her 
sense of right and wrong; a second factor is the person’s feeling of obligation to obey the law and allegiance to 
legal authorities.”); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Role of Deterrence in the Formulation of 
Criminal Law Rules: At Its Worst When Doing Its Best, 91 GEO. L.J. 949, 953–56 (2003). 
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precise determinants of recidivism aren’t well understood, this shows the 
importance of properly monitoring whatever is considered desirable in the 
prison.450 
In the extreme case, where some tasks remain completely unmeasurable 
and shirking on that task is highly detrimental to overall quality, we should 
junk the idea of high-powered incentives: the traditional input-and-output 
approach may then be optimal.451 
If an unmeasurable outcome is represented in the accountability scheme by 
some inputs or outputs as proxies, the possibilities for undesirable strategic 
behavior multiply. The previous examples involved ignoring the unmeasurable 
elements and maximizing the measurable component of performance, rather 
than maximizing overall performance. Replacing unmeasurable elements with 
proxies within the provider’s direct control leads to pursuing the proxies for 
their own sake—which one can uncharitably call “manipulating” the proxy 
measures. 
For example, consider recidivism rates, which I’ve been treating 
throughout as a true outcome measure. In reality, no one knows true recidivism 
rates; we don’t know that a released inmate has committed a crime unless we 
catch him (and, depending on the recidivism measure we’re using, unless we 
convict him or reincarcerate him).452 So in reality, rather than using the 
unmeasurable dimension of recidivism, we’re using the measurable proxy of, 
say, rearrest rates. If the relationship between rearrest rates and true recidivism 
is stable, using this proxy can be harmless;453 but more important still is that 
the contractor not be able to manipulate the rates in ways that don’t correspond 
to true social improvements. 
Thus, if in-prison misconduct is penalized, corrections officers will use 
their discretion very differently when deciding whether to write up an 
 
 450 See infra Part III.C.4; see also Cullen et al., supra note 13, at 84 (“Of course, some correctional 
managers might attempt to develop a painful prison in hopes of scaring offenders straight. We are confident 
that these efforts will fail and place managers at a disadvantage.” (citation omitted)). 
 451 See Holmstrom & Milgrom, supra note 439, at 27 (“[I]ncentives for a task can be provided in two 
ways: either the task itself can be rewarded or the marginal opportunity cost for the task can be lowered by 
removing or reducing the incentives on competing tasks. Constraints are substitutes for performance incentives 
and are extensively used when it is hard to assess the performance of the agent.”). 
 452 See supra text accompanying note 120.  
 453 Of course, the relationship between rearrest rates and true recidivism can change—for instance, 
enforcement agencies might, over time, reallocate resources from one type of crime to another. This raises the 
question of whether to control for baseline rates. See supra Part II.C.2.c. 
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offense.454 If urinalysis tests based on suspicion are rewarded, we can 
magically expect more inmates to seem suspicious. Perhaps the output (drug 
tests based on suspicion) seems to have a straightforward correlation with the 
outcome (inmate drug use, if one chooses to consider that an outcome455); but 
make it a subject of compensation, and you can’t rely on that correlation 
anymore. Administrators will start pursuing the output for its own sake. 
(Random drug tests unrelated to suspicion remove that gaming problem, even 
if they are more expensive for the same level of deterrence.) 
Similarly, in the context of community corrections, Joan Petersilia 
criticizes the use of recidivism rates as an outcome measure: if the number of 
arrests increases, is that bad because more people are committing offenses? Or 
is it good because probation officers are better at detecting technical violations 
and sending released offenders back to prison?456 If we decided that increased 
arrest rates were bad and attached penalties to that variable, we might find 
arrest rates plummeting, but merely because probation officers stopped 
supervising their charges very closely. 
Recidivism may thus be a bad measure for the accountability of probation 
officers. But it can be a good measure for the accountability of prisons, 
provided that prisons leave supervision and rearrest to entirely separate actors. 
This is a reason to insist on the separation of prisons and probation officers, not 
granting contracts to criminal justice providers that are too integrated, and 
more generally preventing prisons from giving any incentives at all, even 
subtle ones, to probation officers.457 Similarly, the results of drug testing can 
be an acceptable measure, but random testing is better than testing based on 
suspicion. In-prison misconduct can be an acceptable measure, but it should be 
the type of serious misconduct that’s least likely to be overlooked or 
characterized as something else. 
We might even have to guard against other kinds of gaming: if prisons can 
affect where prisoners are released, for instance by partnering with post-release 
job placement programs that have good contacts in particular areas, they can 
try to have prisoners released in areas where policing is weaker. For 
understandable political economy reasons, a state Department of Corrections 
 
 454 See GAES ET AL., supra note 7, at 51. Currently, there is, to the contrary, some incentive for private 
firms to exaggerate infractions so as to prevent early releases. See Dolovich, supra note 5, at 518–23. 
 455 I prefer to think of drug use as neutral in itself, though one can want to control inmate drug use 
instrumentally for the sake of outcomes like violence or rehabilitation. 
 456 See Petersilia, supra note 316, at 66–67; see also GAES ET AL., supra note 7, at 23–24; supra note 76. 
 457 See Smith, supra note 443, at 286, 290–92 (discussing “suboptimization” and “measure fixation”). 
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might choose to ignore the welfare of people in other states and tie 
compensation only to an in-state measure of recidivism; then, the prison does 
better by finding out-of-state jobs for its inmates. A prison might also try to 
prevent recidivism by “paying offenders to desist,” but this might be 
controversial.458 
Of course, even if we only use performance measures to reward providers, 
providers will inevitably have to translate these incentives into specific input- 
or output-based incentives to reward their own staff, at least in part—there are 
limits to the possibilities of stock options.459 And such incentives can 
sometimes backfire for the same reasons that input-based incentives can 
backfire at the prison level. At one CCA prison in Tennessee, the employee 
compensation policy discouraged “use-of-force incidents.”460 In general, this 
can be positive, but sometimes not: for nine straight months, CCA personnel 
stopped removing mentally ill inmate Frank Horton from his cell for showers, 
exercise, and mental health evaluations, because any attempt to do so would 
have been considered a “use of force” and could have affected their bonuses or 
pay raises.461 Presumably, though, a provider motivated by good performance 
measures will have better incentives and better ability to monitor its own staff 
than the government has to monitor the provider. 
3. Distortion Across Types of Inmates 
One common complaint about high-powered outcome-based incentives is 
that they’ll lead to two related phenomena: “creaming”—only taking the 
easiest inmates—and “parking”—not providing services to the most difficult 
inmates.462 There’s an easy way to prevent providers from taking the easiest 
inmates: insist that providers take all comers,463 limit opportunities for 
 
 458 DICKER, supra note 123, at 19. 
 459 On the use of stock options in private prisons, see Volokh, supra note 6, at 174. 
 460 Braswell v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 419 F. App’x 662, 628 (6th Cir. 2011). 
 461 Id. at 623–24. 
 462 See DICKER, supra note 123, at 23; see also RICHARD A. MCGOWAN, PRIVATIZE THIS?: ASSESSING THE 
OPPORTUNITIES AND COSTS OF PRIVATIZATION 166 (2011); Barnow, supra note 230, at 287, 297–98, 305–06; 
Pozen, supra note 79, at 283; Kyle, supra note 162, at 2112; Inwood, supra note 210. For a recent example of 
parking in a non-prison context, see Mary Shinn et al., Despite Backlogs, VA Disability Claims Processors Get 
Bonuses, WASH. POST, Aug. 25, 2013, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-08-25/world/41446536_1_ 
claims-processors-new-claims-backlog. 
 463 See Gilroy, supra note 163 (“So literally, you have the private vendor take over the exact same 
population, and then use the same metrics you use to assess the public facilities.”); cf. Volokh, supra note 449, 
at 806–07 (arguing that requiring prisoners to take all comers makes sense to prevent prisons from 
systematically rejecting certain inmates). 
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providers to transfer inmates they don’t like out of the prison, and have 
assigning agencies not discriminate either in favor of or against particular 
providers in assignment.464 And the bias toward treating easier inmates can be 
alleviated by mandating particular services for everyone. There remains, 
though, the concern that providers will be, for instance, more enthusiastic 
about providing rehabilitative services to those that can more likely benefit 
from them. 
There are two lines of response to this concern. Clearly, paying the same 
rate, regardless of how hard the offender is to serve, will lead to parking; one 
can therefore provide payments that are inmate specific, where a harder-to-
serve inmate’s desistance from crime is rewarded more generously than an 
easier-to-serve inmate’s.465 These payments can be based on the observable 
characteristics of the inmate; some characteristics might be illegal to consider 
while others can be better observed by the provider than by the government, so 
there will inevitably be some degree of mismatch.466 But a system of 
nonuniform rewards can generally alleviate parking. 
The second line of response would question whether parking is even bad. 
Suppose some inmates are hard to rehabilitate, so prisons—in the presence of 
uniform rewards—will tend to spend less time trying to rehabilitate them. Is 
this bad? Some nonuniformity of rewards will be inevitable—presumably a 
murder by a released inmate will be penalized more heavily than a minor 
crime. But suppose there’s a group of inmates whose recidivism is equally 
harmful. Wouldn’t it be socially beneficial for the provider to concentrate its 
resources on the ones whose crimes can be prevented most cheaply, so that 
more inmates can be treated at the same cost?467 At least, so an efficiency 
framework might counsel. If one subscribes to a certain form of equity where 
everyone should have some amount of (even ineffective) rehabilitation, one 
might want to fall back on the solution I mentioned above: offering higher 
 
 464 See supra text accompanying notes 135–36. 
 465 See DICKER, supra note 123, at 24; NICHOLSON, supra note 216, at 6–7; David Boyle, The Perils of 
Obsessive Measurement, RSA (Nov. 1, 2010), http://comment.rsablogs.org.uk/2010/11/01/perils-obsessive-
measurement/. 
 466 Cf. Volokh, supra note 344, at 806–07 (discussing inmate characteristics that institutions are able to 
consider). 
 467 One could argue—though I’m not doing so here—that even outright creaming, where prisons only 
accept the easier-to-treat inmates, might be beneficial, since it might be worthwhile to separate the “better” 
criminals from the harmful influence of the “worse” ones. See, e.g., Volokh, supra note 449, at 837–38. 
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payments for the harder-to-treat inmates468 or, if that can’t be done reliably, 
mandating some amount of inputs or outputs. 
4. Falsifying Performance Measures 
Finally, when high-stakes compensation depends on numbers, there’s an 
obvious incentive to falsify the numbers themselves.469 Reports of school 
cheating scandals are commonplace.470 Similarly, in the prison context, private 
providers plausibly prefer to underreport incidents, at least if they wouldn’t 
inevitably become known.471 Failure to report is grounds for contract 
termination, which can cut in the other direction, but contract termination is a 
strong remedy that’s rarely used.472 Public prisons, on the other hand, might 
have an incentive to overreport to get more funds but they also might have an 
incentive to underreport to make themselves look better compared to private 
prisons.473 Misconduct data are thus somewhat unreliable, especially if one 
wants to use them to compare different prisons. 
Whichever way the incentives cut, the fact that compensation will 
inevitably be to some extent based on variables reported by the provider means 
that it’s important to seriously invest in monitoring. Currently, monitoring 
practices vary quite a lot, “from minimal attention from a centrally located 
contract administrator to a combination of a contract administrator and one or 
more on-site monitors.”474 The monitors themselves may have responsibility 
for more than one facility, which puts them on site at any particular prison 
once a quarter, once a week, or daily.475 Instead, contracts should provide for a 
full-time, on-site monitor476 with “unlimited access to the correctional facilities 
 
 468 DICKER, supra note 123, at 25. 
 469 See Smith, supra note 443, at 292; Boyle, supra note 465. 
 470 See, e.g., Emily Richmond, Did High-Stakes Testing Cause the Atlanta Schools Teaching Scandal?, 
ATLANTIC (Apr. 3, 2013, 11:50 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/04/did-high-stakes-
testing-cause-the-atlanta-schools-cheating-scandal/274619/. 
 471 See JOEL DYER, THE PERPETUAL PRISONER MACHINE: HOW AMERICA PROFITS FROM CRIME 211, 221 
(2000); Gaes et al., supra note 60, at 18; Low, supra note 222, at 39 (citing JOHN L. CLARK ET AL., REPORT TO 
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: INSPECTION AND REVIEW OF THE NORTHEAST OHIO CORRECTIONAL CENTER ch. 
VII.B.2 (1998) (reporting that CCA’s legal counsel warned administrators not to write reports about incidents 
because of potential legal liability); id. chs. VIII, XI; HARDING, supra note 145, at 323–24); Developments in 
the Law—The Law of Prisons, supra note 9, at 1884. 
 472 See supra text accompanying notes 267–68. 
 473 See Gaes et al., supra note 60, at 18. 
 474 MCDONALD ET AL., supra note 22, at 50. 
 475 See id. at 50, 51 tbl.4.1. 
 476 See Thomas, supra note 138, at 109. 
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and assigned correctional units,”477 who isn’t the provider’s employee (even if 
the contract might mandate that the provider pay his salary as part of the 
deal).478 When prisoners are sent out of state, monitoring is more likely to be 
“on paper” rather than “in person”—which is one reason to keep one’s 
prisoners in state. 
Because the capture of monitors is an enduring concern,479 other forms of 
monitoring are possible: a public-interest group could be given inspection 
rights,480 the surrounding community might be designated as a third-party 
beneficiary,481 or the constitutional tort regime for prisons could be 
strengthened (rather than weakened, which is the current trend).482 
A strong disclosure regime is also probably a good idea.483 
One way of guaranteeing disclosure is to subject private prisons under 
contract with the federal government to the Freedom of Information Act,484 
perhaps along the lines of the often-proposed Private Prison Information Act. 
Private prison firms themselves aren’t “agencies” for the purposes of FOIA,485 
and the Bureau of Prisons isn’t covered if it hasn’t “created and retained” or 
doesn’t actually possess the documents.486 Even after these hurdles, much 
qualifying information, like contracts or incident reports, would be exempt 
under Exemption 4, which protects “trade secrets and commercial or financial 
 
 477 S.B. 2038, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess., sec. 1, § 944.7115(8)(d) (Fla. 2012). 
 478 See id.; see also Nicole B. Cásarez, Furthering the Accountability Principle in Privatized Federal 
Corrections: The Need for Access to Private Prison Records, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 249, 293 (1995) (citing 
Ira P. Robbins, The Legal Dimensions of Private Incarceration, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 531, 752 (1989)) 
(explaining that Robbins’s Model Contract “calls for an employee of the contracting agency to have access to 
prison facilities and all records kept by the contractor at all times”); Low, supra note 222, at 39 (citing CLARK 
ET AL., supra note 471, ch. XI); Gilroy, supra note 163 (discussing the full-time monitor at each private prison 
in Ohio plus surprise inspections by the Correctional Institution Inspection Committee). 
 479 Cásarez, supra note 478, at 295; Dolovich, supra note 5, at 490, 493–95. 
 480 See Low, supra note 222, at 38. 
 481 See Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1285, 
1317 (2003). 
 482 See generally Volokh, supra note 149. 
 483 See Cásarez, supra note 478, at 293–94 (noting that the American Correctional Association requires 
that certain records be maintained “for facility accreditation and the contracting agency”). 
 484 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012). 
 485 See Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S. 169, 180 (1980) (stating that whether a private firm is subject to 
FOIA depends on whether it’s subject to extensive, day-to-day government control); see also Cásarez, supra 
note 478, at 268–79. 
 486 See Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 152 (1980) (explaining that 
FOIA requires an agency to disclose only documents it has “created and retained”); see also Cásarez, supra 
note 478, at 279–84. 
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information . . . [that is] privileged or confidential.”487 Exemption 4 could be 
applied either if “disclosure could impair the reliability of data,”488 or if 
“disclosure would cause substantial competitive injury to the provider.”489 The 
competitive injury justification could be fairly broad—knowing the terms of a 
contract, for instance, can reveal the terms of the winning proposal to the 
winning firm’s competitors.490 Indeed, FOIA has been criticized as “a lawful 
tool of industrial espionage.”491 On the other hand, says Cásarez, FOIA 
provides for the disclosure of “reasonably segregable portion[s]” of 
documents,492 which “should include monitoring and reporting 
requirements.”493 Logan counsels against “saddl[ing] private prison operators 
with expensive monitoring requirements ‘far beyond those that exist for 
government prisons,’”494 but FOIA applicability would cut in the direction of 
establishing parity. 
Similar legislative fixes are possible in the states: for instance, in Florida 
and Georgia, open records acts “already apply to private organizations that act 
on behalf of state agencies.”495 All of this (as well as any relevant public-law 
value) could also be imposed on private contractors by contract; Jody Freeman 
calls this process “publicization.”496 
Another possibility is to ensure access to the prison by the public and the 
press.497 Bentham, who had smart things to say about the bidding process two 
centuries ago,498 also argued for “essentially unrestricted public access”499 to 
(private) facilities. His prison design 
enables the whole establishment to be inspected almost at a view, it 
would be my study to render it a spectacle, as persons of all classes 
 
 487 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4); Cásarez, supra note 478, at 284–91. 
 488 Cásarez, supra note 478, at 287 (citing Critical Mass Energy Project v. NRC, 975 F.2d 871, 878 (D.C. 
Cir. 1992)). 
 489 Id. 
 490 See id. at 289; see also supra text accompanying note 36. 
 491 Cásarez, supra note 478, at 292 (quoting Stephen S. Madsen, Note, Protecting Confidential Business 
Information from Federal Agency Disclosure After Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 109, 113 
(1980)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 492 5 U.S.C. § 552(b). 
 493 Cásarez, supra note 478, at 289. 
 494 Id. at 260 (quoting CHARLES H. LOGAN, PRIVATE PRISONS: CONS AND PROS 147 (1990)). 
 495 Id. at 296 (citing as examples FLA. STAT. ANN. § 119.011(2) (West 1985); GA. CODE ANN. § 50-18-
70(a) (Michie 1994)). 
 496 Freeman, supra note 481, at 1285. The term is pronounced [pŭb’lĭ-kĭ-zā’shən]. Id. at n.1. 
 497 Cásarez, supra note 478, at 299 (citing Robbins, supra note 478, at 752–53). 
 498 See supra text accompanying note 252. 
 499 Durham, supra note 20, at 69. 
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would, in the way of amusement, be curious to partake of: and that 
not only on Sundays at the time of Divine service, but on ordinary 
days at meal times or times of work: providing therefore a system of 
inspection, universal, free, and gratuitous, the most effectual and 
permanent securities against abuse.500 
I don’t want to endorse watching prisoners as a source of amusement (and 
public access raises serious security and access-to-contraband issues), but the 
idea of at least some public access does seem to have some advantages in 
terms of accountability. 
CONCLUSION 
The failure of the comparative effectiveness studies, therefore, is 
completely understandable. Aside from the methodological problems, it’s quite 
plausible that the results of prison privatization have been inconclusive 
because the changes in prison management that would lead to better 
performance are often neither permitted nor rewarded. 
Using performance measures would change this by helping us do valid 
comparative studies, enabling the fair public-private competitions that are a 
hallmark of competitive neutrality, and pushing policymakers to clearly 
formulate what we want out of prisons. Using performance measures directly 
to drive compensation has the potential to radically alter prison outcomes by 
rewarding good performance and penalizing bad performance; this definitely 
has applicability for private prisons but could possibly be used for public 
prison wardens as well. 
The critiques are serious, but I don’t believe they undermine the experiment 
too seriously. 
The information necessary to calculate the True Social Values in an 
efficiency framework may never be available, but we can approach the 
exercise with an air of humility, seeking only to improve incentives at the 
margins, not to achieve optimal social engineering. 
The use of market incentives probably won’t alter the public-interestedness 
of those who work at private prison firms, but it might alter the mix of people 
who choose to work in the public sector; on the other hand, combined with 
social impact bonds, performance-based compensation can also spur the 
 
 500 Id. (quoting JEREMY BENTHAM, A BENTHAM READER 200 (Mary Peter Mack ed., 1969)). 
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growth of nonprofit providers. Because small firms and nonprofits are 
particularly sensitive to risk, the incentives should only be moderately high-
powered, to trade off incentives and risk tolerance. 
Performance-based compensation will give rise to certain possibly 
undesirable strategic behavior. If providers can set their own goals, they’ll be 
inclined to set them in ways that are easy to meet; this is why providers 
shouldn’t set the goals at all, and in any event compensation should be based 
on the level of a continuous variable, not a binary goal. If some dimensions of 
quality are hard to measure, performance-based compensation will bias 
providers’ effort toward the more measurable aspects of performance; this 
means that some reliance on inputs and outputs will still be necessary, having 
due regard for the need to avoid choosing measures that can be easily and 
undesirably manipulated by providers. Compensation schemes might lead 
providers to concentrate on treating certain inmates and neglect others; even if 
this is bad (which isn’t clear), the problem can be alleviated by inmate-specific 
rewards. Finally, the levels of the measures themselves can be falsified, which 
points to the need for serious investments in monitoring and robust disclosure 
regimes. 
These concerns are real, but the lesson to take from them is that more 
experimentation is required to see how much of a real-world effect they have 
and to what degree they really vitiate the promise of performance incentives. 
The status quo, where the level of experimentation is close to zero, is unlikely 
to be optimal. 
 
